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THE 1986 AND 1987 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
CASES: IT'S ALL OVER BUT 
THE SHOUTING 
Herman Schwartz* 
For the moment, the affirmative action wars are over. In a ten-
year set of decisions, culminating in five during the last two terms, the 
Court has now legitimated almost all types of race and gender prefer-
ences, even if they benefit nonvictims, including voluntarily adopted 
preferences in hiring, promotion, university admissions, and govern-
ment contracting;1 hiring and promotion preferences in consent de-
crees;2 and court-ordered hiring and promotions. 3 It has approved 
preferences by both public and private bodies, and for both racial-eth-
nic minorities and women. It has barred only layoffs of white (and 
presumably male) employees who have more seniority than employees 
hired under an affirmative action plan. 4 
The legitimacy of preferences for nonvictims was not, of course, 
the only issue left unresolved by prior decisions. For example, if race-
preferential programs are permissible to remedy prior discrimination, 
as the earlier decisions implied, whose discrimination had to be 
shown? Was it enough if there had been societal discrimination, or 
discrimination by someone other than the person using an affirmative 
action program?5 What kind of factual showing or finding had to be 
made, who was competent to make it, and when would it have to be 
made?6 Would gender preferential plans be treated the same as race-
preferences? Would promotional preferences be treated like hiring 
* Professor of Law, American University Law School. A.B. 1953, J.D. 1956, Harvard. -
Ed. 
My appreciation to George Strickler, David Silberman, Richard Sobol, Norman Redlich, and 
Barry Goldstein for their invaluable help. 
1. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 192 (1979) (hiring); Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987) (promotion); University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978) (university admissions); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (government 
contracts). 
2. Local 93, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986). 
3. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Intl. Assn. v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); United States 
v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987). 
4. Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 
106 s. Ct. 1842 (1986). 
5. Compare Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265-324, with Justice Brennan's 
opinion, 438 U.S. at 324-79. 
6. See 438 U.S. at 265-324 (Powell, J.). 
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preferences or like layoffs? What other preconditions would the Court 
require? 
Most of these questions have now been answered in a way 
favorable to the supporters of race- and gender-conscious action. Only 
peripheral issues remain, and even some of these may have been im-
plicitly resolved. 
The 1986-1987 decisions were surprising. Just three years ago, 
Firefighters Local Union 1784 v. Stotts 7 seemed to presage the demise 
of almost all race-conscious programs. In seemingly unequivocal lan-
guage, the Court read Title VII to allow relief "only to those who have 
been actual victims of illegal discrimination."8 The 1986 decisions, 
however, relegated Stotts to a special situation - layoffs in a modifica-
tion of a consent decree. And this past term, the opponents' last hopes 
were dashed as the Court upheld a hiring and promotion plan for 
women adopted by the Santa Clara Transportation Department in an 
opinion for a five-member majority that seemed designed to end most 
disputes. Despite the inevitable loose ends, some of which are both 
troublesome and unnecessary, the Court validated most of the many 
voluntary affirmative plans currently in force. 
Perhaps the result should not have been entirely unexpected, for 
there were precedents enough.9 And the disruption that a contrary 
ruling would have caused would give any court pause, for there are 
literally hundreds of thousands of such plans, 10 covering many mil-
lions of workers. Moreover, outside the Reagan administration affirm-
ative action is now widely accepted. One of the astonishing aspects of 
the controversy is how much opposition developed to the administra-
tion's effort to kill affirmative action, particularly among the business 
community. 11 
7. 467 U.S. 561 (1984). The specific substantive issue in Stotts was whether senior nonmi-
nority employees could be laid off to preserve increases in minority employment. 
8. 467 U.S. at 580. Solicitor General Rex E. Lee called Stotts a "slam dunk" of a decision. 
See Barbash, High Court Rules for Seniority, Not Affirmative Action, Wash. Post, June 13, 1984, 
at Al, col. 5. 
9. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 448; Weber, 443 U.S. at 193. 
10. Bandow, A Do-It-Yourself Agenda for President Reagan, 8 CATO POLY. REP., Nov.-Dec. 
1986, at 1, 10. 
11. See, e.g., Affirmative Action: Joint Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and Subcomm. on Employment Op-
portunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 207 (1985) [here-
inafter Hearings] (testimony of William McEwen, National Association of Manufacturers). The 
strength of affirmative action is also reflected in the inability of one of the most popular presi-
dents in history to rewrite E.O. 11246 (requiring affirmative action by government contractors), 
which he could do by a stroke of his pen, as well as in the almost uniformly negative response to 
Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds by 51 jurisdictions when he urged them 
to use Stotts as a basis for abandoning their affirmative action plans. Affirmative Action Revisions 
Revisited, Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 1985, at Al, col. 1. Of 21 "top papers" in the country that 
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Perhaps most significant is that in Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency, 12 the most sweeping and definitive of the Court's affirmative 
action opinions, the Court issued a majority opinion for five Justices, 
one of the few times it has done so in a decision upholding affirmative 
action, 13 and the opinion was by Justice William Brennan, who is the 
most frequent spokesman for the Justices favoring affirmative action. 14 
And Justice Lewis F. Powell signed on to the Brennan opinion with-
out adding anything separately, which he rarely did even when joining 
a majority. Powell was the only Justice who had been on the winning 
side in every single affirmative action case in which he participated,15 
and he almost always had been either the plurality's spokesperson, or 
the swing opinion. 
Johnson was not a 5-4 decision, however, but 6-3, for Justice San-
dra Day O'Connor concurred separately, and her opinion, despite her 
expressions of misgiving about the outcome, may prove the most im-
portant. Whereas the majority chose to decide the case only on statu-
tory and not on constitutional grounds, she dealt with both in a way 
that probably validates voluntary public plans as well. 
Three Justices dissented, with the lead dissent an outraged cri de 
coeur by freshman Antonin Scalia. In what was basically an attack on 
the majority for following United Steelworkers v. Weber, 16 Justice 
Scalia signaled a readiness to overrule that case. Despite. six votes on 
the other side (now five with Justice Powell's resignation), this raises 
some clouds on the future of affirmative action. There almost cer-
tainly will be some new Justices in the next few years in addition to 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and if they share Justice Scalia's hostil-
ity toward affirmative action and disdain for precedent, then these de-
cisions may not last very long. 
commented on the 1986 cases, only one opposed the use of affirmative action to remedy discrimi-
nation, and 17 praised the decisions without any qualifications. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF 
B'NAI B'RITH, BIG SO PRESS SURVEY: U.S. SUPREME COURT "AFFIRMATIVE ACTION" RUL· 
INGS - PREFERENTIAL HIRING OF MINORITlES 2 (Sept. 10, 1986). The 1987 decisions were 
also enthusiastically received by the business community. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, § 4, at 
1, col. 4 (quoting Stephen Boskat, vice-president and general counsel, United States Chamber of 
Commerce). 
12. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). 
13. Weber, 443 U.S. at 193, was the first and Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3063, the second. 
14. The other two are Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun. 
IS. Justice Powell recused himself in Weber, as did Justice John Paul Stevens. 
16. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Weber held that "Title VII does not prohibit ••• race-conscious 
affirmative action [hiring] plans." 443 U.S. at 197. 
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I. THE CASES 
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education17 
Jackson, Michigan hired its first black schoolteacher in the 1953-
1954 school year. By 1968-1969, when black students made up 15.2% 
of the student body, black teachers accounted for only 3.9% of the 
teaching staff. In 1969, the Jackson NAACP filed a complaint with 
the Michigan Civil Rights Commission charging student segregation 
and discriminatory hiring and assignment. 18 The Commission's inves-
tigation concluded that "each of the allegations ... can be substanti-
ated," 19 and the Jackson School Board took steps to desegregate its 
schools. Recruitment efforts were made, but when layoffs became nec-
essary in 1971, they were made in order of seniority, and many newly 
hired minority teachers were laid off. This "literally wip[ ed] out all 
the gain,"20 according to the school superintendent. 
In February 1972, racial tensions in the school system exploded. 
A new contract was adopted which provided that the goal of minority 
hiring "shall be to have at least the same percentage of minority racial 
representation on each individual staff as is represented by the student 
population of the Jackson Public Schools," and that should layoffs be-
come necessary, "at no time will there be a greater percentage of mi-
nority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority 
personnel employed at the time of the layoff."2 1 
When layoffs became necessary again in April 1974, the board ig-
nored the contract and followed seniority. After litigation in both fed-
eral and state courts, the layoff provision was upheld, though neither 
the federal nor the state court found that the board had discriminated 
against minorities in its hiring practices. 22 When layoffs were again 
made, they were in accordance with the 1972 contract. Laid-off white 
teachers sued, claiming a denial of equal protection. 23 
Both sides moved for summary judgment. Though noting that 
"[i]n both Weber and [Detroit Police Officers Association v.j Young 
[608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979)] it was appropriate, when searching for 
evidence of past discrimination, to compare the percentage of blacks in 
17. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986). 
18. Brief for Respondents at 3-4, Wygant (No. 85-1340). 
19. 106 S. Ct. at 1859 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
20. 106 S. Ct. at 1859. 
21. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (quoting 
Jackson teachers' contract, art. VII D.1 and art. XII B.1). 
22. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1845 (Powell, J.). 
23. Other grounds not pertinent here were also raised. See Wygant, 546 F. Supp. at 1199. 
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the employer's work force with the percentage of blacks in the relevant 
labor pool," the district judge decided that: 
in the setting of this case, it is appropriate to compare the percentage of 
minority teachers to the percentage of minority students in the student 
body, rather than with the percentage of minorities in the relevant labor 
market .... [M]inority teachers are role-models for minority students. 
This is vitally important because societal discrimination has often de-
prived minority children of other role-models.24 
And he granted summary judgment for the defendant on this ground. 
No comparison between the proportion of blacks in the work force 
and in the relevant labor pool was made. 
The court of appeals relied almost entirely on the district court's 
opinion, but also noted the existence of historic discrimination and 
observed that the agreement was "designed to remedy past obvious 
race discrimination . . . and racial tensions engendered by that 
history."25 
The Supreme Court reversed, though no majority was mustered 
for any one opinion. A plurality opinion by Justice Powell for himself, 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist, 
joined in part by Justice O'Connor, first rejected societal discrimina-
tion, and particularly the role-model theory, as a predicate for the 
race-preferential affirmative action plan approved by the lower courts. 
The board's argument that it could prove prior discrimination was dis-
missed with the comment that the argument was not only belated, it 
was also irrelevant because the layoff provision would be invalid in any 
case.26 
Justice Powell went on to reaffirm his earlier expressed view that 
strict scrutiny must be given to all racial classifications in lieu of the 
lower court's apparent use of a "reasonableness" standard: "We have 
recognized," he acknowledged, "that in order to remedy the effects of 
prior discrimination it may be necessary to take race into account."2' 
But, he went on to say, "the Board's layoff plan is not sufficiently nar-
rowly tailored. Other, less intrusive means of accomplishing similar 
purposes - such as the adoption of hiring goals - are available."28 
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Powell 
that strict scrutiny was appropriate, but also noted that there were 
governmental interests not mentioned by Powell or considered by the 
24. 546 F. Supp. at 1201. 
25. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1159 (6th Cir. 1984). 
26. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1849. 
27. 106 S. Ct. at 1850. 
28. 106 S. Ct. at 1852 (footnote omitted). 
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Court that might be found "sufficiently 'important' or 'compelling' to 
sustain the use of affirmative action policies." She also observed that 
"the Court has forged a degree of unanimity ... that a plan need not 
be limited to the remedying of specific instances of identified discrimi-
nation for it to be deemed sufficiently 'narrowly tailored,' or 'substan-
tially related,' to the correction of prior discrimination by the state 
actor."29 
Justice O'Connor concurred as well in Justice Powell's rejection of 
societal discrimination as an acceptable predicate for a remedy. This 
led her also to reject Jackson's plan, but on two grounds that seem 
different from Powell's: first, because the lower courts had applied a 
reasonableness standard instead of strict scrutiny, and second, because 
the layoff provision was keye.d to a "hiring goal [parity with minority 
student representation] that itself has no relation to the remedying of 
employment discrimination."30 Unlike Justice Powell, she apparently 
reserved the question of whether layoffs were ever acceptable, saying 
she did not think it necessary to decide whether this or "any layoff 
provision could survive strict scrutiny."31 
Justice White concurred separately on the ground that he could 
never accept racially motivated layoffs as a way to integrate a work 
force.32 
There were two dissenting opinions. In an opinion for himself and 
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, Justice Marshall stressed that the 
plan represented a voluntary and bargained-for compromise to divide 
the burden oflayoffs. He noted that the goal of easing Jackson's racial 
tensions would justify the plan, regardless of whether "societal dis-
crimination" was an acceptable target, and he argued that the Court 
should have remanded for a trial on this issue. As to whether this 
layoff provision was an appropriate "means of preserving the effects of 
an affirmative hiring policy, the constitutionality of which is unchal-
lenged,''33 Justice Marshall insisted that it was absolutely necessary to 
protect minority teachers against layoffs if the recruiting efforts were 
to have any success, because teachers from other states would not "up-
root their lives and move to Michigan" otherwise. 34 Further, he noted 
how often "[t]he general practice of basing employment decisions on 
29. 106 S. Ct. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
30. 106 S. Ct. at 1857. 
31. 106 S. Ct. at 1857. 
32. 106 S. Ct. at 1857 (White, J., concurring). 
33. 106 S. Ct. at 1860 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
34. 106 S. Ct. at 1864. 
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relative seniority may be upset for the sake of other public policies. "35 
Justice Stevens dissented separately. He would have upheld the 
plan not on any theory of past discrimination but because "a school 
board may reasonably conclude that an integrated faculty" would 
have educational benefits.36 This was not a plan that excluded anyone, 
but rather was designed to include more minority faculty. "The inclu-
sionary decision is consistent with the principle that all men are cre-
ated equal; the exclusionary decision is at war with that principle."37 
The collective bargaining procedures used to adopt the plan were fair, 
and the harm to the nonminorities was 
not based on any lack of respect for their race, or on blind habit and 
stereotype. Rather, petitioners have been laid off for a combination of 
two reasons: the economic conditions that have led Jackson to lay off 
some teachers, and the special contractual protections intended to pre-
serve the newly integrated character of the faculty in the Jackson 
schools. Thus, the same harm might occur if a number of gifted young 
teachers had been given special contractual protection because their spe-
cialties were in short supply and if the Jackson Board of Education faced 
a fiscal need for layoffs. Js 
Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC39 
In 1964, the New York State Commission for Human Rights 
found that Local 28 had excluded blacks from union membership and 
from the union's apprenticeship program, in violation of state law. 
Local 28 defied the Commission's orders to comply with the law, and 
the Commission obtained a state court order. This, too, proved inef-
fectual and in 1971 the United States sued the union under Title VII. 
In 1975, the federal district court found intentional exclusion of 
blacks, discrimination, and bad faith. It ordered a 29% nonwhite 
membership goal, and an apprenticeship program with "a white-non-
white ratio to be negotiated by the parties."40 An administrator was 
appointed and after the plan was modified on appeal, the union was 
given more time for compliance. 
In 1982, the plaintiffs moved that the union be held in contempt 
for violating the order. The court found that petitioners had defied the 
order "almost from its date of entry,"41 and imposed a $150,000 fine 
35. 106 S. Ct. at 1864. 
36. 106 S. Ct. at 1868 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
37. 106 S. Ct. at 1869. 
38. 106 S. Ct. at 1870. 
39. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). 
40. 106 S. Ct. at 3027-28. 
41. 106 S. Ct. at 3029 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at A-156). 
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to be placed in a special fund to increase nonwhite membership in the 
union and the apprenticeship program. 
A year later, the union was again held in contempt for disobeying 
the order. The district court established a 29.23% minority member-
ship goal to be met by August 31, 1987. With some modifications, the 
court of appeals affirmed, distinguishing Stotts. The union, supported 
by the Solicitor General, appealed to the Supreme Court, maintaining 
that the membership goal and fund violated Title VII because they 
gave race-conscious preferences to nonvictims.42 
In an opinion for himself and Justices Marshall, Blackmun and 
Stevens, 43 Justice Brennan rejected the Solicitor General and the 
union's contention as inconsistent with the statutory language, pur-
pose, and legislative history, and with prior decisions. The plurality 
distinguished Stotts, 44 arguing that that case had simply denied make-
whole relief such as competitive seniority, back-pay, or promotion, to 
nonvictims, and was not intended to prevent a court from ordering 
other forms of race-conscious relief for nonvictims.45 
While cautioning that race-preferential relief should not be re-
sorted to routinely, Justice Brennan found the decree against Local 28 
to be necessary because of the union's "long continued and egregious 
racial discrimination" and "foot-dragging resistance";46 also, the de-
cree was flexible, temporary, and would not "unnecessarily trammel 
the interests of white employees."47 For virtually the same reasons, 
the district court's order did not violate the equal protection compo-
nent of the fifth amendment. 
Citing his plurality opinio:p. (which was joined by Justices Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens), Justice Powell's concurrence, and Jus-
tice White's dissent, Justice Brennan summarized that "six members 
of the Court agree that a district court may, in appropriate circum-
stances, order preferential relief benefitting individuals who are not the 
actual victims of discrimination as a remedy for violations of Title 
VIl."48 
Justice Powell concurred, focusing on the constitutional issue. Af-
ter asserting that strict scrutiny must be applied, he generally accepted 
Justice Brennan's conclusions as to alternatives, duration, flexibility, 
42. 106 S. Ct. at 3030-31. 
43. Justice Brennan wrote for the Court on other issues not relevant here. 
44. 467 U.S. 561 (1984). 
45. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3048-50 (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J.). 
46. 106 S. Ct. at 3051. 
47. 106 S. Ct. at 3052 (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 208). 
48. 106 S. Ct. at 3054. 
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size of the goal, and harm to nonminorities.49 
Justice O'Connor dissented, because she thought the lower court 
had insisted on the August 31, 1987 deadline "without regard to vari-
ables such as the number of qualified minority applicants available or 
the number of new apprentices needed,"50 thereby turning the goal 
into a quota. Justice White shared this view, though he also stated his 
general agreement with the rest of the Brennan opinion.51 In passing, 
Justice O'Connor criticized the plurality's reading of the statute and 
its legislative history.s2 
Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented briefly, rely-
ing on their much lengthier dissent in Firefighters v. Cleveland, 53 
which argued that section 706(g) of Title VIl,54 as interpreted in 
Stotts, precluded any race-conscious relief for nonvictims. 
Local 93, International Association of Firefighters 
v. City of Clevelandss 
This case turned out to be the least controversial decision, for it 
was the most limited. 
The Vanguards, an association of black and Hispanic firefighters, 
entered into a consent decree with the City of Cleveland setting aside a 
certain number of promotional opportunities for minorities; the union 
objected. For a six-member majority, Justice Brennan read section 
706(g) as a limitation solely on court orders and not on consent de-
crees, which were held not to be "orders" within the meaning of the 
statute, but voluntary agreements. He avoided ruling on what limita-
tions section 706(g) might impose, while acknowledging that such 
agreements were still subject to the prohibitory provisions of section 
49. 106 S. Ct. at 3054-57 (Powell, J., concurring). 
50. 106 S. Ct. at 3061 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
51. 106 S. Ct. at 3062 (White, J., dissenting). 
52. 106 S. Ct. at 3058-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
53. 106 S. Ct. at 3082. 
54. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982), sets out the courts' 
remedial powers. In pertinent part, it provides: 
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engag-
ing in an unlawful employment practice . . . the court may enjoin the respondent from 
engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be 
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, 
with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri-
ate ..•. No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual 
as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an 
employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, 
suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or 
discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin or in violation of ... this title. 
55. 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986). 
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703 of Title VIl56 and, for public agencies, subject to the fourteenth 
amendment. Stotts's reach was again limited, this time to cases involv-
ing a court-ordered modification of consent decrees. 57 
Justice White dissented on the ground that insofar as the consent 
decree gave minorities preference over whites with respect to promo-
tions, this displaced whites as much as did layoffs. 58 The dissent by 
Justice Rehnquist, which Chief Justice Burger joined, accepted the So-
licitor General's argument that Stotts and the legislative history dic-
tated that consent decrees were "orders" under section 706(g), and 
that only specific identified victims of discrimination were entitled to 
relief under the statute. 59 
United States v. Paradise6o 
This seemed the easiest case of all, but was only a 5-4 decision and, 
as in so many of these cases, there was no opinion for the Court, the 
lead opinion mustering only four votes. 
For thirty-seven years, the Alabama State Police had not hired a 
single black trooper. In 1972, Judge Frank Johnson imposed a hiring 
order, but by 1979 there were still no blacks at any upper level of the 
Department. Four years later, after two consent decrees and several 
unfulfilled promises by the Department to develop an acceptable pro-
motional procedure, the Court ordered that "for a period of time," at 
least 50% of future promotions to corporal must be black "if there 
were qualified black candidates [and] if the rank were less than 25% 
black," until the Department developed and implemented a valid pro-
motion plan. 61 The Department then promoted eight blacks and eight 
whites to corporal, and submitted an acceptable promotion plan, at 
which time the 50-50 order was suspended.62 
Although the United States was the original plaintiff in the case, it 
opposed the 50-50 promotional requirement on equal protection 
grounds. It lost. A plurality opinion by Justice Brennan, for himself 
56. Section 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2002e·2, details Title Vll's prohibitions against discrimination 
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
57. 106 S. Ct. at 3079. Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), invalidated a 
district court order enjoining the City of Memphis from following its seniority system during 
firefighters layoffs. It specifically rejected the Union's argument that the injunction was either an 
enforcement or a modification of a consent decree entered into by the City and the Union to 
remedy past discriminatory hiring and promotional practices. 467 U.S. at 573-83. 
58. 106 S. Ct. at 3081-82 (White, J., dissenting). 
59. 106 S. Ct. at 3085-87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
60. 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987). 
61. 107 S. Ct. at 1062-63 (emphasis in original). 
62. 107 S. Ct. at 1063-64. 
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and Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell, stressed that the plan 
was sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the strictest scrutiny. The 
plurality found the plan was an interim procedure necessitated by the 
Department's recalcitrance in presenting a valid promotional plan and 
its need for fifteen more corporals. Alternatives were either never pro-
posed to the district court or were inadequate. In any event, the plu-
rality noted, it was important to "acknowledge the respect owed a 
District Judge's judgment that specified relief is essential to cure a vio-
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... [The Court has not] 're-
quired remedial plans to be limited to the least restrictive means of 
implementation.' "63 
Justice Stevens, concurring separately, would have gone even fur-
ther. Citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 64 
he insisted that since an egregious violation had been proven, "the 
District Court had broad and flexible authority to remedy the wrongs 
resulting from this violation - exactly the opposite of the Solicitor 
General's unprecedented suggestion that the judge's discretion is con-
stricted by a 'narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental 
interest' standard.''6s 
The dissenters also focused on the issue of alternatives. Justice 
O'Connor wrote for herself, the Chief Justice, and Justice Scalia, and 
insisted that the district court's 50-50 order was not "manifestly neces-
sary" because other methods were available and the district court had 
failed to "expressly evaluate the available alternative remedies."66 
"[T]o survive strict scrutiny, the District Court order must fit with 
greater precision than any alternative remedy," she argued, but in this 
case "[t]he District Court had available several [less burdensome] 
alternatives. " 67 
As usual in these cases, Justice White was enigmatically negative. 
He dissented separately in two terse sentences saying he agreed with 
"much of what Justice O'Connor ha[d] written" (without saying how 
much) and thought it "evident that the District Court exceeded its 
equitable powers.''68 
63. 107 S. Ct. at 1073 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 508). 
64. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
65. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1077 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
66. 107 S. Ct. at 1080, 1082 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
67. 107 S. Ct. at 1082. 
68. 107 S. Ct. at 1080. 
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Johnson v. Transportation Agency69 
In December 1978, the Santa Clara District Board of Supervisors 
unilaterally adopted an affirmative action plan pursuant to which the 
Transportation Agency agreed to consider sex as a factor in promoting 
within traditionally segregated job classifications where women were 
substantially underrepresented in proportion to their representation in 
the county labor force. In the Skilled Craft Worker category, which 
covered "[ o ]ccupations in which workers perform jobs which require 
special manual skill and a thorough and comprehensive knowledge of 
the process involved in the work which is acquired through on-the-job 
training and experience or through apprenticeship or other formal 
training programs,"70 none of the 238 positions were held by women. 
The plan noted that this underrepresentation of women in part re-
flected the fact that women had not traditionally been employed in 
these positions, and that they had not been strongly motivated to seek 
training or employment in them "because of the limited opportunities 
that have existed in the past for them to work in such classifica-
tions."71 The official reason for adopting the plan was that "mere pro-
hibition of discriminatory practices is not enough to remedy the effects 
of past practices and to permit attainment of an equitable representa-
tion of minorities, women and handicapped persons."72 
On December 12, 1979, the agency announced a vacancy for the 
promotional position of road dispatcher, which falls into the "Skilled 
Craft Worker" category. Twelve employees applied, including Diane 
Joyce and Paul Johnson. Each was experienced and had earlier ap-
plied for the road dispatcher position in 1974, but each had been 
turned down for lack of experience. 
Nine applicants, including Joyce and Johnson, passed the first 
screen and were then interviewed by a two-person board. Johnson tied 
for second at 75 and Joyce was next with 72.5, rounded to 73. Only 
Joyce and Johnson were rated "well-qualified," with no negatives; the 
top candidate lacked clerical experience. 73 The seven top candidates 
then went before a three-man board of supervisors who unanimously 
recommended Johnson. 
Joyce was apprehensive of possible prejudice against her because 
she had experienced difficulties with two of the three men on the final 
69. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). 
70. 107 S. Ct. at 1453 n.12. 
71. 107 S. Ct. at 1446 (quoting Joint Appendix at 31). 
72. 107 S. Ct. at 1446 (quoting Joint Appendix at 57). 
73. Joint Appendix at 27-28, Johnson (No. 85-1129). 
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panel: one of them had earlier described her as a "rebel-rousing skirt-
wearing person,"74 and another had apparently treated her unfairly 
compared to male workers, which the trial court described as conduct 
that "may be indicative of discriminatory intent on the part of [panel 
member] Mr. Baldanzi."75 Joyce therefore contacted the affirmative 
action officer who recommended to the agency director that Joyce get 
the promotion. After some deliberation, the extent of which was dis-
puted, the director chose Joyce. He explained that he had "tried to 
look at the whole picture," including affirmative action.76 
After complaining to the Equal Employment Opportunities Com-
mission and receiving a right-to-sue-letter, Johnson sued under Title 
VII and won. He raised no constitutional issues. The district court 
found Johnson was more qualified, and that Joyce's sex was the "de-
termining factor" in the promotion. It concluded that the plan was 
not sufficiently temporary as Weber 77 required, but was "a permanent 
part of the agency's operating philosophy."78 
The Ninth Circuit overturned the district court's ruling, finding 
that the plan was intended only to attain, not to maintain a balance, 
and that the absence of a termination date was not dispositive; the 
other Weber criteria were also met. The court added that the statistics 
of underrepresentation - no women out of 238 employees - estab-
lished a prima facie case of discrimination against women in the 
Skilled Craft Worker category.79 
The Supreme Court affirmed. In an opinion for a five-member ma-
jority, Justice Brennan upheld the plan under Weber, refusing to apply 
the Wygant criteria80 because the prohibitory scope of Title VII "was 
not intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution."81 The 
agency's plan was acceptable because it was designed to correct a 
"manifest imbalance" in "traditionally segregated job categories"; the 
agency did not have to prove a prima facie case of its own discrimina-
tion or even an "arguable violation" of the law. The program was 
temporary because it was designed to attain, not maintain, a balanced 
work force. It was :flexible, because the agency had quickly recognized 
it could not meet its ultimate goals and had revised them downward, 
74. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1448 n.5. 
75. Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 9a, Johnson. 
76. 107 S. Ct. at 1464-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
77. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
78. Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 7a, Johnson (emphasis in original). 
79. 770 F.2d 752, 758 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985), affd., 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). 
80. See text at notes 26-29 supra. 
81. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1449-50 n.6. 
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and the plan did not operate according to strict numbers but on an 
individual basis. Finally, the plan did not unnecessarily trammel the 
interests of male employees because it involved neither a discharge nor 
an absolute bar to males' advancement. 
Justice Stevens concurred, while joining in the majority opinion, to 
stress that Title VII did not preclude preferences for other reasons 
besides remedying prior discrimination, such as improving services to 
ethnic constituencies, defusing racial tension, or increasing the diver-
sity of a work force. 82 
Justice O'Connor concurred separately to insist on compliance 
with Wygant. 83 To her, Title VII and the fourteenth amendment's 
equal protection clause imposed identical standards. Therefore, before 
an employer could voluntarily give racial or gender preferences, there 
had to be .a firm basis for believing that the anti-discrimination law 
had been violated. This, in tum, required the plaintiff to produce suffi-
cient evidence for a prima facie case under Title VII - a standard 
explicitly rejected by the majority. Applying the constitutional stan-
dards to this case, she concluded that a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion had indeed been made, since none of the 238 Skilled Craft 
Workers were women. 
Justice Scalia, for himself and the Chief Justice, wrote an angry 
dissent, 84 attacking the majority for not adopting the Wygant stan-
dard, for ignoring what he saw as the limitations of Sheet Metal Work-
ers, 85 and indeed, for not overruling Weber, which he considered 
wrongly decided both as to the legislatively intended meaning of Title 
VII, and sound policy. He called instead for a virtual repudiation of 
all preferences. Justice White joined in part of the Scalia dissent, in-
cluding the call for overruling Weber. White thought Weber had in-
volved "intentional and systematic exclusion of blacks by the 
employer and the unions from certain job categories," but since "[t]he 
Court now interprets it to mean nothing more than a manifest imbal-
ance between one identifiable group and another in an employer's la-
bor force," he viewed Weber and Johnson as "a perversion of Title 
VII."86 
82. 107 S. Ct. at 1460 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
83. 107 S. Ct. at 1460 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
84. 107 S. Ct. at 1465 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
85. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); see text at note 112 infra. 
86. 107 S. Ct. at 1465 (White, J., dissenting). 
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II. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION 
The central issues after Stotts were whether any race- or gender-
conscious affirmative action is legal and constitutional, and if so, 
when? The first 1986 decision, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion, 87 answered the "whether" question affirmatively and decisively. 
As Justice O'Connor put it, "the Court has forged a degree of unanim-
ity ... that [an affirmative action] plan need not be limited to the 
remedying of specific instances of identified discrimination. "88 
Wygant and the remaining decisions fleshed out the "when." 
Somewhat oversimplified, the governing rules seem to be these: 
For a race- or gender-conscious affirmative action plan not involv-
ing layoffs to pass constitutional muster, it probably89 will be subjected 
to strict scrutiny, so that the plan must further a compelling state pur-
pose and be narrowly tailored. Remedying the effects of prior discrimi-
nation is at least one acceptable purpose, and to be narrowly tailored, 
a plan must be temporary, flexible, and necessary; the number of mi-
norities or women to be favored must be proportionate to a relevant 
qualified pool; and the interests of nonminority or male workers 
should not be unduly burdened. These rules seem applicable to both 
voluntary90 and court-ordered91 public-agency plans. 
An affirmative action plan affecting employment can be ordered by 
a court without running afoul of Title VII if such a remedy is neces-
sary in order to remedy "persistent or egregious discrimination," to 
"dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination," and per-
haps in "other circumstances." It must be flexible and temporary and 
may not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees."92 
An employer may voluntarily adopt such a plan, if it is designed to 
"eliminate manifest racial [or gender] imbalances in traditionally seg-
regated job categories," does not "unnecessarily trammel the interests 
of ... white [or male] employees" or create an "absolute bar" to their 
advancement,93 and is "intended to attain a balanced work force," not 
"to maintain a permanent racial and sexual balance. "94 
Although there may be some slight theoretical differences between 
87. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986); see text at notes 17-38 supra. 
88. 106 S. Ct. at 1853. 
89. The reasons for the "probably" will be discussed in the text at notes 125-63 infra. 
90. See University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 {1978); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
U.S. 448 (1980); Wygant, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986). 
91. See Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 {1987). 
92. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3050-52 (citing Weber, 443 U.S. at 208). 
93. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1450-51 (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 197). 
94. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1456 (emphasis in original). 
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Title VII requirements for court-ordered plans and the constitutional 
requirements for both court-ordered and voluntary plans, the major 
difference seems to be between what Title VII permits for voluntary 
plans, on the one hand, and the largely similar but apparently more 
stringent requirements for the other three types.95 If the constitutional 
95. Regardless of the wisdom of the public-private distinction discussed in the text below, see 
text at notes 96-105 infra, there seemed to be a solid six-member majority (until Justice Powell's 
resignation) for following Weber and allowing a private employer voluntarily to adopt race- or 
gender-preferential plans under less stringent requirements than are required for a court order. 
There are indications that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Powell's successor, also ap-
proves of Weber and Johnson. See note 105 infra. Only Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, who dissented in Weber, explicitly reject the voluntary-involuntary distinction even when 
the discrimination in question is by private employers. 107 S. Ct. at 1470 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
("There is no sensible basis for construing Title VII to permit employers to engage in race- or 
sex-conscious employment practices that courts would be forbidden from ordering them to en-
gage in following a judicial finding of discrimination."). Justice White's views on this issue are 
unclear. 
Justice Scalia's attack is actually on race- or gender-conscious affirmative action itself. Not 
only does he call for overruling Weber on the basis of the Rehnquist dissent in that case, but his 
reference to affirmative action as "intentional discrimination on the basis of race or sex" confirms 
the hostility toward any kind of race- or gender-conscious affirmative action that he showed 
before he joined the bench. 107 S. Ct. 1472 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Scalia, The Disease 
As Cure, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 156 ("I am, in short, opposed to racial affirmative action for 
reasons of both principle and practicality. Sex-based affirmative action ... seems to me an 
equally poor idea .... "). This is also shown by his passing criticism of Bakke in his Johnson 
dissent. 107 S. Ct. at 14 74. 
Weber has been fully discussed in the literature. See, e.g., Meltzer, The Weber Case: The 
Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 
(1980); Cox, The Question of "Voluntary" Employment Quotas and Some Thoughts on Judicial 
Role, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 87 (1981); Blumrosen, Affirmative Action in Employment after Weber, 34 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1981). It may, however, be worth responding to those of Justice Scalia's 
points that reflect developments since Weber was decided: 
(I) Justice Scalia claims that subsequent congressional silence implies nothing about whether the 
Weber Court rightly read the intent of the 1964 Congress that enacted Title VII, calling the 
silence argument a "canard." 107 S. Ct. at 1473 (Scalia, J., dissenting). That normally would be 
true, but Johnson involved the 1972 Act, and there are strong indications that the Congress that 
brought state and local agencies under Title VII was fully aware of Executive Order 11246 re-
quiring federal contractors to adopt quota relief, and the many decisions almost uniformly au-
thorizing such a remedy. See the legislative history discussion in Sheet Metal Workers by Justice 
Brennan, 106 S. Ct. at 3045-47. Indeed, Congress explicitly rejected Senator Ervin's amendment 
to overturn the affirmative action requirements of Executive Order 11246. SENATE SUBCOMM. 
ON LABOR OF COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 1017, 1042, 1074 (Comm. Print 1972) 
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Moreover, the decision to bring state and local govern-
ments under Title VII was stimulated largely by a 1969 Civil Rights Commission Report, see 
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 
78-80; S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, 
at 419; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 1114-17 (debate), which called for goals to "giv[e] the 
work force the shape it presently would have were it not for such past discrimination ... to be 
achieved within a specified period of time." Id. at 1120. See also id. at 197-98, 1167-68, 1173. 
The Civil Rights Commission report also urged that higher test performance by nonminorities 
should not govern selection if"competing minority applicants, especially if they have waiting list 
seniority, are qualified to do the job." Id. at 1121. See also the report on hiring Mexican-Ameri-
cans for state and local law enforcement, inserted into the Congressional Record during the de-
bate, id. at 1136-37, which incorporates the pertinent sections of the above-mentioned 1969 Civil 
Rights Commission Report. 
(2) Justice Scalia denigrates the values of stability and stare decisis, saying that Weber itself 
created instability. 107 S. Ct. at 1473-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Conversations with Title VII 
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standards for voluntary plans are significantly more stringent than the 
statutory requirements, affirmative action hiring and promotion plans 
by many public agencies remain under a constitutional cloud.96 
At least five members of the Court seemed to believe that the con-
stitutional requirements for public plans should indeed be more strin-
gent, for both race- and gender-conscious plans. In Johnson, Justice 
Brennan, writing for the Court, rejected the views of the dissenters and 
Justice O'Connor that "the obligations of a public employer under Ti-
tle VII must be identical to its obligations under the Constitution, ... 
[and] therefore, should be governed by Wygant." Dismissing an argu-
lawyers and others indicate no such instability; indeed, overruling Weber would create enormous 
disruption, which is one reason why employers and unions both opposed the challenge to the 
Santa Clara plan. Furthermore, if Weber were overruled, Firefighters, which dealt with consent 
decrees, would have to be overruled since that decision built on Weber. Overruling Weber would 
thus disrupt the myriad employment practices and programs created as a result of consent de· 
crees as well. 
(3) Justice Scalia claims that Weber spawned numerous "suspensions of disbelief,'' including the 
assertions that Kaiser's plan was truly voluntary; that Bakke merely allowed some consideration 
of race in order to achieve diversity; and that the plan in Johnson merely required "considera-
tion" of women and was not mandatory. 107 S. Ct. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting). His claims 
are, at best, factually controvertible. Santa Clara County's plan in Johnson was indeed volun· 
tary, regardless of the metaphysics of"voluntariness." Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke (which, 
incidentally, preceded Weber) did call for individual consideration; but the Powell opinion was 
for only one Justice, and the joint opinion of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White 
did not take that position. And the "consideration" in Johnson was real. Given equal qualifica· 
tions, obviously, there was a push to choose Joyce; for what does an affirmative action policy 
mean, if not that? Had the margin between Johnson and Joyce been substantial, however, there 
was evidence that Joyce would not have been the winner. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1465 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring). 
(4) Finally, Justice Scalia describes the outcome of this and other decisions as permitting hiring 
on the basis of "minimum qualifications." 107 S. Ct. at 1474 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Perhaps, but 
not on the record in this case. Both Joyce and Johnson were deemed "well-qualified" and were 
the only two candidates who had no drawbacks. Joint Appendix at 27-28, Johnson (No. 85· 
1129). Moreover, Johnson was chosen by a three-man board exercising a subjective judgment 
based on a selection interview. This is normally considered the most dubious kind of selection 
procedure, for it is subject to grave abuse. Brief for American Society for Personnel as Amicus 
Curiae at 10, n.4, Johnson (No. 85-1129) ("[E]vidence regarding the validity of the selection 
interview yields a distinctly disappointing picture."). Abuse was quite likely here - two of the 
three men who chose Johnson over Joyce had had run-ins with Joyce, and according to the 
district court, the actions of one of these men "may [have been] indicative of discriminatory 
intent." Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 9a, Johnson (No. 85-1129). On such n record, it is 
hard to accept the charge that as a result of this decision, only the "utterly unqualified," 107 S. 
Ct. at 1474 (Scalia, J., dissenting), will not prevail over the "well qualified." See 107 S. Ct. nt 
1464-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
96. The Justice Department has adopted this position. A few days after the Johnson deci-
sion, Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds told the New York Times that the 
Department would continue its challenge to an affirmative action plan setting numerical goals for 
the District of Columbia Fire Department. Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(denying rehearing to 813 F.2d 12 (D.C. Cir. 1987.)) Mr. Reynolds said that Johnson had "very 
little impact" on the Hammon case, and his spokesman added that other public affirmative action 
plans were "still subject to challenge on constitutional grounds." Pear, Administration Attacks 
Affirmative Action Plan, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1987, at Al4, col. 5. Hammon was decided on Title 
VII grounds, however, though Judge Silberman's concurrence draws the distinction. 826 F.2d at 
85-86 (Silberman, J., concurring). The decision is criticized in The Supreme Court 1986 Term -
Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 309 n.68 (1987). 
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ment that because Title VI standards are the same as the constitu-
tional obligations, Title VII requirements must also be the same as 
those of the Constitution, he declared that "the [Title VII] statutory 
prohibition with which that [public] employer must contend was not 
intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution."97 And in Para-
dise, Justice Powell's concurring opinion observed that "I have not 
thought the standards of analysis in Title VII and Equal Protection 
cases - though similar - are identical."98 
Why not? Why should the constitutional standard be stiffer?99 
The Court provides no good reason, and in fact there is none. 
The Weber majority suggested one possible reason for a difference 
by construing the 1964 Act, which did not apply to public agencies, to 
grant private employers freedom from governmental interference. The 
strength of this kind of interest is likely to be far less where public 
employers are concerned, as Justice Scalia pointed out. 100 But the pri-
mary goal of Weber and of the many other decisions construing con-
gressional intent in Title VII was to encourage voluntary remediation 
of the effects of past or present exclusion, 101 and this certainly applies 
with at least as much force to public as to private employers. Given 
Weber, it would be "anomalous" (as Justice O'Connor said in Wygant) 
if "what private employers may voluntarily do to correct apparent vio-
lations ... public employers are constitutionally forbidden to do." 102 
Moreover, the statutory provisions on which the Court relied in 
Weber and in Firefighters - sections 703(a), (d), and G), and section 
706(g) of Title VII - draw no distinctions between public and private 
employers. Nor does the legislative history of the 1972 amendments. 
97. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1449 n.6 (emphasis in original). 
98. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1075 n.l (Powell, J., concurring). It seems likely that Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist would also find the constitutional standard more stringent. See Bushey v. New 
York State Civil Serv. Commn., 469 U.S. 1117, 1121 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari). 
99. See Bushey v. New York State Civil Serv. Commn., 733 F.2d 220, 227 n.8, cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 1117 (1985); but see Williams v. New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1565, 1574 (5th Cir. 
1984) (Gee, J., concurring; Wisdom, J., concurring and dissenting). 
100. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1472; but cf National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 
(1976) (state employment practices not subject to federal regulation), overruled by Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
101. See, e.g., Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 611 n.9 (1984); Johnson, 107 S. 
Ct. at 1451; Weber, 443 U.S. at 203-07; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 
(1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). 
102. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1855. Even the Solicitor General recoguized that inconsistencies 
between Title VII and the Constitution would be "unfortunate." Amicus Brief of the Solicitor 
General at 9 n.5, Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1986). See also the virtual identity of the constitu-
tional and Title VII standards in sections V and IV(E) of Justice Brennan's opinion in Sheet 
Metal Workers. Justice Powell cited constitutional and Title VII precedents in Sheet Metal 
Workers without distinguishing between them. 106 S. Ct. at 3055-56. 
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To the contrary, as Senator Harrison Williams, floor leader for the 
1972 amendments, put it: "At this time in our country's history, it 
should be beyond question that the employees of State and local gov-
ernments are entitled to the same benefits and protections in equal 
employment as are employees in the private sector." 103 This history 
indicates rather that Congress added state and local agencies to im-
prove enforcement of anti-discrimination laws against these agen-
cies, 104 not to change the substantive standards. 
Admittedly, it is logically possible for Title VII standards to be 
identical for private and public employers, and for public agencies to 
be subject also to higher constitutional standards. But if Congress 
thought there would be such a difference between public and private 
employers, with the constitutional provisions significantly more strin-
gent than those of Title VII, it surely would have so indicated. 
What was really at stake here was maintaining a majority for up-
holding affirmative action. Three justices have voted for affirmative 
action in every case to come before the Court - Brennan, Marshall, 
and Blackmun - and Justice Stevens has voted similarly in each of 
the recent five cases. Justice Powell was the crucial fifth vote. Not 
only was he the only Justice to be on the winning side in every single 
affirmative action case in which he participated since Bakke (which 
marked the beginning of the Court's sharp division) but his vote was 
crucial to upholding affirmative action plans in Bakke, Sheet Metal 
Workers, and Paradise, three of the six cases on which he sat which 
upheld plans. In all the constitutional decisions from Bakke to Para-
dise, Justice Powell read the constitutional requirements very strictly, 
at least on the surface. If a majority for affirmative action was to be 
held together, either Justice Powell or Justice O'Connor had to be per-
suaded to vote for it, and Justice Powell was the more important be-
cause he seemed more sympathetic. 105 
103. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 95, at 1113; see also id. at 1115. 
104. s. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 95, at 419-20, 434 ("By placing the full weight of the U.S. Attorney General and the author-
ity of the U.S. district courts behind equal employment opportunity at the state and local govern-
ment level, the committee believes that the machinery has been provided to insure state and local 
leadership in the area of equal employment opportunity."); see also H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 95, at 78-79. 
105. In contrast to Justice Powell, Justice O'Connor voted against affirmative action plans in 
both Sheet Metal Workers and Paradise, wrote a concurring opinion in Firefighters to stress the 
narrowness of the holding and is clearly critical of Weber. See Joint Appendix at 1-2, Johnson 
(No. 85-1129). 
Justice Powell's newly confirmed successor, Justice Kennedy, has expressed support for vol-
untary affirmative action in university admissions policies, in private employment, and in em-
ployment consent decrees. See Nomination Hearings of Anthony M Kennedy to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 85-
87 (transcript, Dec. 16, 1987). 
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS 
What then are the constitutional standards? Will they indeed 
prove to be more difficult to meet than those of Weber and Title VII? 
There is an initial confusing complexity. Affirmative action plans 
may prefer either racial/ ethnic minorities, or women, or both. But the 
constitutional rules on discrimination are usually different for racial 
and gender discrimination, 106 even though the Court in Johnson held 
that the Title VII statutory standards are the same. Since the Court's 
constitutional affirmative action decisions have dealt only with the ra-
cial variety, this discussion will initially focus on race, with the diffi-
culties arising from the difference in constitutional treatment of 
minorities and women to be explored later. 
There are three fundamental questions: (A) the level of scrutiny; 
(B) the nature of the prior discrimination that can justify an affirma-
tive action program; and (C) the narrowness of the "tailoring." 
A. The Level of Scrutiny 
1. Where the Justices Stand 
In equal protection cases, the conventional first step is to deter-
mine the subject matter and group affected by the official classification. 
This is generally, though often wrongly, thought to be the decisive 
issue, for that subject matter - e.g., race, gender, economic regula-
tion, or fundamental rights - supposedly determines the level of scru-
tiny the Court will give the classification. If the subject calls for 
merely a rational basis for the differential treatment, it is generally true 
that almost anything goes; 107 if that scrutiny is strict, almost nothing 
goes; 108 and if, as in gender and illegitimacy cases, the scrutiny is "in-
termediate," some things will go and some won't. 109 
In trying to contain the damage that the Court did to his position 
in its 1986 decisions, Assistant Attorney General William Bradford 
Reynolds insisted that "it is now a matter of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence that the constitutional level of scrutiny of any race-based classi-
fication remains equally exacting whether the challenged classification 
106. The difference was noted and was part of the reason that the Ninth Circuit upheld a 2% 
set-aside of municipal purchasing for women-owned businesses, while striking down a 10% mi-
nority set-aside. Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco, 813 F.2d. 922 (9th Cir. 1987). 
107. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). 
108. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
On A Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
Justice Powell seemed to recognize this. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 507 (concurring opinion). 
109. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), with Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) 
(gender); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978), with Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (illegit-
imate children). 
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is employed against a group that has historically been subject to gov-
ernment discrimination or operates in reverse."110 
Mr. Reynolds is wrong. As Justice Brennan insisted in both Para-
dise and Sheet Metal Workers, there is no clear majority "on the 
proper test to be applied" in affirmative action cases. 111 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia have urged 
adoption of the strict scrutiny test. 112 But Justice Stevens in Paradise 
and Wygant seems to have adopted a rational-basis-with-bite test, 113 
and in Bakke, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White 
urged the intermediate test in their joint opinion. Justice White's posi-
tion remains ambiguous. 114 For though he has apparently become 
hostile to race- or gender-conscious action, in every constitutional case 
after Bakke - Fullilove, Wygant, Sheet Metal Workers, and Paradise 
- he has consistently declined to join the Powell or O'Connor opin-
ions urging strict scrutiny, even when, as in Fullilove, Paradise, and 
Wygant, he came out the same way as one or both of them. Instead, 
he chose in Fullilove to join the Chief Justice's opinion which refused 
to pick among the tests, and he wrote entirely by himself in Wygant 
and Paradise. 115 
110. Remarks of Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds to the A.B.A., at 3 
(Aug. 12, 1986) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Reynolds A.B.A. Speech]. 
111. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1064; Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3052. 
112. Justice Scalia joined the O'Connor dissent in Paradise, which adopted the strict scrutiny 
test. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1080. 
113. After concluding that the Board had "a rational and unquestionably legitimate basis" 
for the plan, he stressed that the Court "should not lightly approve the government's use of a 
race-based distinction,'' and scrutinized it for fair adoption procedures, narrow breadth, and 
value transcending the harm to the petitioners. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1868, 1870 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). These requirements obviously go beyond the conventional rational basis test. For 
Justice Stevens's general disagreement with the tiered analysis the Court uses, see his concur-
rence in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 451-55 (1985). 
114. Although Justice White formally joined with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Black-
mun in issuing the joint Bakke opinion, and explicitly affirmed his joinder on this issue ("My 
views ... with respect to the equal protection issue ... are included in the joint opinion that my 
brothers Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun and I have filed"), he added a mysterious footnote: "I 
also join Parts I, III-A and V-C of Mr. Justice Powell's opinion." 438 U.S. at 387 & n.7. (This 
was noted in Justice Powell's opinion in Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846, which, however, Justice 
White did not join.) Part III-A of the Powell opinion makes two points: it first rejects the 
distinction between goals and quotas - a distinction on which Justice White relied in his Sheet 
Metal Workers dissent, 106 S. Ct. at 3062 - and then explicitly declares that "[r]acial and ethnic 
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial exami-
nation." 438 U.S. at 291 (emphasis added). Although Justice White may have joined in that 
portion of the Powell opinion primarily because of its discussion of the quota-goal difference, he 
made no such distinction in Bakke, and his strong hostility to relief for nonvictims in Stotts, as 
well as his somewhat grudging acceptance of relief for nonvictims in Sheet Metal Workers both 
indicate support for the strictest standard. See Liebman, Justice White and Affirmative Action, 58 
U. COLO. L. REV. 471 (1987). 
115. White joined the Rehnquist opinion dissenting from a denial of certiorari in Bushey v. 
New York State Civil Serv. Commn., 469 U.S. 1117 (1985), but that opinion focused on whether 
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2. Should the Court Adopt Strict Scrutiny? 
There is no good reason for the Court to adopt conventional strict 
scrutiny - "strict in theory but fatal in fact" 116 - for the affirmative 
action programs considered by the Court. The opportunity for em-
ployment, education, or government contracts is clearly not a funda-
mental right, 117 and whites display none of the usual indicia of a 
suspect class - one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to 
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a 
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary pro-
tection from the majoritarian political process."118 Moreover, whites 
have not been "subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereo-
typed characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities,"119 nor do 
they constitute a "discrete and insular minorit[y],"120 in need of "ex-
traordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."121 
Nor, like women, are whites as a group subject to classifications that 
"generally provide[] no sensible ground for differential treatment" or 
rely upon "outmoded notions of ... capabilities."122 If anything, 
white males have in the past gotten and still do get many preferences, 
though now these are often subtle or disguised. 123 
But these programs classify by race, and racial classifications, we 
are told, are so inherently pernicious that a classification disadvantag-
ing the racial majority must be treated exactly the same as a classifica-
tion disadvantaging racial minorities. Among the anticipated dangers 
are: 
Government recognition and sanction of racial classifications may be in-
herently divisive, reinforcing prejudices, confirming perceived differences 
between the races, and weakening the government's educative role on 
behalf of equality and neutrality. It may also have unexpected results, 
a state agency could voluntarily adopt an affirmative action plan without a preliminary finding of 
discrimination. 
It should be noted that former Chief Justice Burger also seemed unhappy with the three-
tiered approach; see his concurrence in Justice Stevens's opinion in Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451, 
and his opinion in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453. Nevertheless, he joined the Powell opinion in 
Wygant. 
116. Gunther, supra note 108, at 8. 
117. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam); 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1 (1973). 
118. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. 
119. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313. 
120. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
121. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313. 
122. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41. 
123. All of these factors apply equally to males affected by gender-conscious programs for 
women. 
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such as the development of indicia for placing individuals into different 
racial categories. Once racial classifications are imbedded in the law, 
their purpose may become perverted: a benign preference under certain 
conditions may shade into a malignant preference at other times. More-
over, a racial preference for members of one minority might result in 
discrimination against another minority, a higher proportion of whose 
members had previously enjoyed access to a certain opportunity.124 
Obviously, these are not trivial or frivolous considerations. But 
they are only possibilities. Few are likely to occur often or to impose 
great harm even if they do. Such harm as these race-conscious plans 
do create is also relatively easy to remedy, unlike the race-prejudice 
against minorities, by simply terminating the program. With respect 
to either probability or harm, these considerations do not compare 
with the bases for giving the maximum suspect-class status to racial or 
ethnic minorities. 
And the reality is that Justice Powell and at least some of the con-
curring Justices in Wygant, like Justice O'Connor and perhaps Justice 
White, have not really insisted on this conventional strict scrutiny. An 
essential element of the justification for such tight judicial oversight 
was noted by Justice White in the Cleburne case: "[R]ace, alienage, or 
national origin . . . are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any 
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are 
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy."125 Accordingly, the Court 
has approved no anti-minority racial or ethnic programs since the Jap-
anese internment case in World War II. 126 But a very large number of 
race-preferential affirmative action plans apparently remain acceptable 
to the proponents of strict scrutiny. In Bakke for example, Justice 
Powell apparently approved Federal Executive Order 11246. 127 It has 
been estimated that over two-thirds of American workers are covered 
by affirmative action plans under the Order.128 Countless other em-
ployees are in voluntary plans approved by Weber but not required by 
Executive Order 11246, and still more are in plans resulting from 
124. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 17-18 (!st Cir. 1973) (emphasis 
added) (footnotes omitted). See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 360-62 Uoint opinion); Liebman, supra 
note 114, at 488. 
125. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; see also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring); 
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184 (1941); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 
CALIF. L. REV. 341, 356-61 (1949). 
126. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
127. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 301 n.40. Executive Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1964-1965), 
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982), requires federal government contractors to adopt statisti-
cal goals and timetables for women and minorities. 
128. Fallon & Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 SUP. 
Cr. REV. l, 11 n.47. 
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court orders and consent decrees, all almost certainly legitimate under 
the Court's recent and past affirmative action cases. At least in raw 
numbers, racial classifications helping minorities have been found ac-
ceptably "relevant" very often indeed. 
The willingness of Justices O'Connor and Powell to accept the 
"promotion of racial diversity . . . at least in the context of higher 
education" as a compelling goal, 129 even in the diluted "flexible" form 
approved in Bakke, 130 is also inconsistent with a proper (or at least 
conventional) application of strict scrutiny, for that kind of diversity is 
not the real purpose for affirmative action in medical school admis-
sions. A recent study found that: 
The chief goal of affirmative-action programs in medical schools in the 
United States was to increase the numbers and the proportion of minor-
ity physicians. Other objectives were to make more minority physicians 
available to improve the health care of the poor, to supply physicians to 
underserved communities, and to increase the number of physicians pro-
viding primary care.131 
Reliance on what was at best a very minor purpose is not usual where 
strict scrutiny is applied. 
Justice Powell's Fullilove opinion was an especially revealing indi-
cator of how weakly he adhered to the strict scrutiny test. As Justices 
129. See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Justice Powell's opin-
ion in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15). Justice White seems to share Powell's acceptance of this goal. 
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387 n.7 (White, J., concurring in part V-C of Justice Powell's opinion). 
130. See 438 U.S. at 315-20. The Harvard plan approved by Justice Powell contains numeri-
cal goals, though they are purportedly quite flexible. 438 U.S. at 323-24. 
131. Keith, Bell, Swanson & Williams, Effects of Affirmative Action in Medical Schools, 313 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1519 (1985). See also Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Dis-
crimination, 67 CALIP. L. REv. 87, 122 (1979) ("I have yet to find a professional academic who 
believes the primary motivation for preferential admissions has been to promote diversity in the 
student body for the better education of all the students while they are in professional school."); 
Lesnick, What Does Bakke Require of Law Schools?, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 141, 154 (1979) ("[A] 
far more significant social-educational goal ... is ... ameliorating the extreme relative unavaila-
bility of legal representation to members of racial and ethnic minorities."); R. FULLINWINDER, 
THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY, 207 (1980) ("[l]t is difficult to understand 
what is 'compelling' about the interest in student diversity."). 
In Bakke, Justice Powell rejected the goal of more doctors in underprivileged areas, but only 
because he found "virtually no evidence in the record indicating that petitioner's special admis-
sions program is either needed or geared to promote that goal," Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310, or that 
the program would achieve it. He did not reject that goal in principle. Justice Powell's Fullilove 
opinion approving the legislation setting aside 10% of federally funded contracts for minority-
owned businesses indicates he might have been ready to accept even a numerical goal to achieve 
that goal had Congress - or perhaps even a state legislature - made a finding that a racial 
preference was necessary. 
Incidentally, it appears that minority doctors do practice more in underprivileged areas: 
Minorities were not merely admitted to medical schools in much larger numbers; they also 
graduated, took residency training, and entered practice in much larger numbers. More-
over, they entered primary-care specialties, chose to practice in federally designated health-
manpower shortage areas, and cared for ethnic minority and poor patients in a greater pro-
portion than did their nonminority counterparts. 
Keith, Bell, Swanson & Williams, supra, at 1524. 
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Stewart and Stevens pointed out, the plan was both underinclusive and 
overinclusive and the legislative findings were thin, to say the least. 132 
Yet in deference to Congress (and perhaps to any legislative or admin-
istrative body) Justice Powell approved the plan. If all racial distinc-
tions "of any sort" are to be treated similarly, would he have approved 
such a plan affecting minorities unfavorably? 
Other Justices have responded favorably to Justice Powell's sug-
gestion that racial preferences favoring minorities are frequently "rele-
vant." Justice O'Connor, for example, has raised "the possibility that 
the Court will find other governmental interests which have been re-
lied upon in the lower courts ... to be sufficiently 'important' or 'com-
pelling' to sustain the use of affirmative action policies."133 These 
interests could include operational needs, t34 faculty diversity, t3s and 
improving the opportunities for minorities to obtain government 
contracts.136 
The insistence on strict scrutiny is also at odds, though not directly 
inconsistent with, at least some of the reasons for the Court's require-
ment that where a statute is facially neutral, intentional discrimination 
must be shown in order to establish a constitutional violation. 
Although the basis for this insistence on intent is not altogether 
clear, 137 one obvious reason is that it is illegitimate for the majority 
deliberately to use its power to manifest its prejudice and antipathy 
toward a weaker group by harming it. If, however, the weaker group 
132. 448 U.S. at 528-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting); 448 U.S. at 539-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
133. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1853. 
134. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1868 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Detroit Police Officers' Assn. v. 
Young, 608 F.2d 671, 695-96 (6th Cir. 1979); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir. 
1974). This goal is especially important for public agencies, as Congress pointed out when it 
extended Title VII in 1972 to state and local employees. The House Education and Labor Com-
mittee found that: 
[t]he problem of employment discrimination is particularly acute and has the most deleteri-
ous effect in these governmental activities which are most visible to the minority communi-
ties (notably education, law enforcement, and the administration of justice) with the result 
that the credibility of the government's claim to represent all the people equally is negated. 
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1971). The Cities of Birmingham, Detroit, Los 
Angeles, and the District of Columbia filed amicus briefs in Paradise making this point, but the 
Brennan plurality opinion found it unnecessary to decide whether this goal was sufficiently com-
pelling. 107 S. Ct. at 1065 n.18. For a discussion of how Detroit's affirmative action plan im-
proved police-community relations, see Schwartz, Affirmative Action, in MINORITY REPORT 58, 
71 (L. Dunbar ed. 1984). 
135. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1854 n.• (O'Connor, J., concurring) (issue not raised and there-
fore need not be discussed). 
136. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 462-63 (upholding program that set aside 10% of feder-
ally funded local public works projects for minority-owned businesses); Ohio Contractors v. 
Keip, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding program earmarking 5% of yearly state construc-
tion contracts for minority business enterprises). See also Justice Stevens's opinions in Johnson 
and Wygant. But see cases cited in note 196 infra. 
137. Binion, "Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 SUP. Cr. REV. 397. 
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is incidentally injured by an unprejudiced and otherwise properly mo-
tivated act, then, as in the veterans' preference decision, there is no 
constitutional violation. As Justice Stewart put it in that case, 
"'[d]iscriminatory purpose' ... implies that the decisionmaker ... 
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'be-
cause of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifi-
able group."138 Indeed, even where there is an explicit racial 
classification, invidious intent is necessary .139 
Affirmative action plans do not arise from "prejudice or antipathy" 
toward whites, and any resulting harm to them is incidental and unin-
tended. There is no "invidious intent." Like the veterans' preference, 
preferential plans to benefit disadvantaged groups are adopted "in 
spite of," not "because of," any adverse impact on the majority, for 
their purpose is only to help those groups to overcome the disadvan-
tages, not to harm anyone. Those handicaps are analogous to the vet-
eran's sacrifices for the nation and his problems in making the 
transition from military to civilian life that are the justification for the 
veterans' preference.140 If there were enough jobs for all who wanted 
them, affirmative action plans would not disadvantage whites either in 
intent or effect, 141 whereas actions motivated by racial prejudice are 
intended to harm, regardless of whether there are enough to go 
around. That is a difference of both constitutional and moral dimen-
sions.142 Indeed, some affirmative action plans like those in Weber and 
Firefighters actually increase job opportunities for whites. 143 
138. Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d at 
619 (without invidious intent, no constitutional violation). 
139. See, e.g., United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977) (redistricting "plan 
represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race") (emphasis added); 
Tancil v. Wools, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam), ajfg. Hamm v. Virginia State Bd. of Election, 
230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964) (racial statistics in divorce decrees); Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 
1865-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dictum discussing choice of informers to infiltrate racially ho-
mogeneous group); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968), (Harlan, Black & Stewart, JJ., 
concurring) (racial tensions in prison can justify segregation). 
140. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 265. See Thomson, Preferential Hiring, 2 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 364, 
379-80 (1973); but see R. FULLINWINDER, supra note 131, at 46-48 (questioning moral basis for 
veterans' preference). 
141. See Dershowitz & Dershowitz, Dialogue: Assessing Affirmative Action, MOMENT, June, 
1983, at 33, 35-36. 
142. See Fiss, supra note 125, at 152; Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1869 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
The centrality of prejudice and hostility is reflected also in Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 125, 
at 358 (discussing suspect classifications: "[T]he prohibition against discriminatory legislation is 
a demand for purity of motive .... It erects a constitutional barrier against legislative motives of 
hate, prejudice, vengeance, hostility .... "). See also R. FULLINWINDER, supra note 131, at 214-
15 (supporting intermediate standard for a racial classification that "does not stigmatize or imply 
racial hostility"). 
143. The affirmative action program in Weber created a craft training program that white 
workers had unsuccessfully sought for years. Memorandum of United Steelworkers of America 
in Opposition to Request by the United States for Summary Remand at 6, Weber (No. 78-432). 
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Should Justice Powell's approach be followed by a future majority, 
equal protection law in practice will have not three tiers of scrutiny 
but five: 
(1) true strict scrutiny for racial and ethnic classifications that ex-
clude and stigmatize; 
(2) less strict scrutiny for affirmative action racial preferences; 
(3) intermediate scrutiny for classifications affecting gender and 
illegitimacy; 
(4) heightened rational scrutiny for the mentally retarded and per-
haps other special categories, like the mentally disturbed;144 and 
(5) traditional rational scrutiny for conventional economic and 
welfare regulation.14s 
An anomaly of this array is that despite Justice Powell's claim that 
the first two categories are really one, 146 in practice, the scrutiny given 
affirmative action may be weaker than intermediate. The latter has 
often resulted in close and controversial decisions striking down classi-
fications that disadvantaged either women, men, or illegitimate chil-
dren, whereas all that seems necessary to validate affirmative action 
not involving layoffs is prior discrimination. In practice, this may not 
be too difficult to establish, 147 and even if it is, other justifications are 
possible, as noted above. 
Does it make much difference what standard is adopted, if the 
Court applies it with wisdom and sensitivity? Insofar as affirmative 
action is concerned, so long as the Court allows some of these pro-
grams to survive, the important issues would seem to revolve more 
In Firefighters, the plan increased the number of available supervisory positions. 106 S. Ct. at 
3068-69. 
144. See Cleburne, 413 U.S. at 455 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment); Deibler v. 
Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1986); Ferguson v. Garmon, 643 F. Supp. 335 (D. Kan. 
1986); Sullivan v. Pittsburgh, 620 F. Supp. 935 (D. Pa. 1985); Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 
983 (D. Kan. 1985). 
145. With the exception of affirmative action, the degree of scrutiny actually given the differ-
ent classifications seems to depend on the relative levels of community prejudice and relevance. 
Thus, racial characteristics score high on prejudice and low on relevance, whereas conventional 
economic regulation has the opposite relationship as to each. The scrutiny given classifications 
based on gender, illegitimacy, and retardation involves significant prejudice but also is often rele-
vant to classifications based on retardation, and occasionally on gender and illegitimacy classifi-
cations. Affirmative action seems to involve high relevance and little or no prejudice, making it 
like conventional rational scrutiny. But the Court has discerned possibilities of significant preju-
dice, see text at note 86 supra, and, if my reading is correct, has added a concern for excessive 
unfairness. Other exceptions to conventional rational-scrutiny analysis also occasionally appear 
where vital necessities are concerned, see, e.g., United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 
528 (1973) (food stamps); Wohlgemuth v. Williams, 416 U.S. 910 (1974) (per curiam) (welfare), 
or in what is essentially a commerce clause context, where that clause is unavailable as a basis for 
decision, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985). 
146. "The level of scrutiny does not change .... " Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846. 
147. See text at notes 200-20 infra. 
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around the stringency of the conditions for such survival than about 
the particular level of scrutiny the Court claims it is applying. Never-
theless, the doctrinal confusion does generate problems, particularly if 
public and private plans are to be treated differently. 
For example, a level of scrutiny for affirmative-action "discrimina-
tion" favoring minorities that is nominally identical to the standard 
for discrimination against racial minorities raises the possibility that it 
will be watered down in the latter cases the way it seems to be in the 
former. If Justice Powell was willing to accept an after-the-fact invo-
cation of ethnic diversity in Bakke as a "compelling" reason for dis-
criminating against whites, even though it is very unlikely that it was 
the real goal, why should the courts not accept equally dubious asser-
tions about actions aimed against racial minorities? The current Jus-
tice Department is certainly likely to argue that the courts should. 
More importantly, a constitutional identification of affirmative ac-
tion with the racial discrimination experienced by blacks is morally 
offensive. Can one seriously equate a preference intended to remedy 
centuries of discrimination - even if only "societal discrimination" 
the existence of which all concede - with the brutality inflicted on 
blacks and other minorities by racist laws and practices? The prefer-
ence may take away some benefits from some white men, but none of 
them is being beaten, lynched, denied work, forced to take the dirtiest 
jobs, or stigmatized as an inferior being. The problems raised by set-
ting aside a few places a year for qualified minorities out of hundreds 
and perhaps thousands of employees, as in the Kaiser plant in the 
Weber case, 148 or sixteen medical school places out of one hundred as 
in Bakke, 149 or 0.25% of construction work as in Fullilove, 150 or eight 
out of sixteen state police corporalships on an interim basis as in Para-
dise, 151 or even fifty perce~t of new hires or promotions, 152 are not in 
148. Weber, 443 U.S. at 199 (seven blacks entered program during first year). 
149. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 27~. 
150. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484 n.72. 
151. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1063. 
152. See Detroit Police Officers' Assn. v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 697 (6th Cir. 1979): 
Bakke and Weber make i~ clear that a case involving a claim of discrimination against mem-
bers of the white majority is not a simple mirror image of a case involving claims of discrimi-
nation against minorities. One analysis is required when those for whose benefit the 
Constitution was amended or a statute enacted claim discrimination. A different analysis 
must be made when the claimants are not members of a class historically subjected to dis-
crimination. When claims are brought by members of a group formerly subjected to dis-
crimination the case moves with the grain of the Constitution and national policy. A suit 
which seeks to prevent public action designed to alleviate the effects of past discrimination 
moves against the grain, and the official actions complained of must be subjected to the 
analysis prescribed in Weber and the plurality opinion in Bakke which we find controlling. 
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the same moral universe as the brutalities inflicted by racism on 
blacks. 
Problems of equality and fairness are not solved by an incantation 
of the tautological "equal means equal."153 Rather, as Justice White 
put it in the Cleburne case, "all persons similarly situated should be 
treated alike."154 When some have been handicapped seriously in ap-
plying for a job or a university admission by the accident of having 
been born into a racial minority, they are not "similarly situated" to 
those in the racial majority with respect to that job or admission. 
This does not, of course, mean that one can be indifferent to the 
burden that a particular affirmative action program might impose on 
possibly innocent individual members of the white majority. 155 In-
deed, the weight, necessity, and fairness of such a burden seem to be 
the most important factors in determining which plans are acceptable 
under the analysis developed by Justice Powell (and apparently 
adopted, at least in part, by Justices White and O'Connor). 156 But 
some burden on nonculpable whites is deemed acceptable even under 
the Reagan Administration's view that relief is to be limited to specific 
victims of discrimination, as well as under the Court's approval of 
make-whole relief for identified victims and of many affirmative action 
programs.157 Questions about the appropriateness and extent of that 
burden should therefore be (and are) addressed in the discussion of 
whether the means to accomplish the accepted purposes of affirmative 
action are appropriately tailored to minimize that harm. 158 To deal 
with such questions, it is unnecessary to insist on strict scrutiny for 
programs that modestly open a previously-shut door, on the dubious 
ground that such programs have the same basic vices as the practices 
that originally shut those doors. 
A special problem in adopting a strict standard for race-preferen-
tial affirmative action is the uncertainty this creates about affirmative 
153. See, e.g., Pear, Rights Commission Abandons Backing of Racial Quotas, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 18, 1984, at Al, col. 3, A19, col. 3 (quoting Morris Abram, member, United States Commis· 
sion on Civil Rights); see also Schwartz, supra note 134. 
154. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added); see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW 155 (1961); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 125, at 344. 
155. Contra Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1458 n.3 (Stevens, J.). 
156. See Part 111.B infra; see also Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at Part V (Brennan, J.). 
Justice White has made it clear that he will not accept plans that result in what he considers the 
equivalent ofa "discharge" of white workers. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1857-58 (White, J., concur· 
ring). For critical comments on such considerations of "unfairness" see Fiss, supra note 125, at 
129-36, 147-56; Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1858 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[U]nfairness ought not be 
confused with constitutional injury."). 
157. E.g., Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1850 (plurality); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484; Franks v. Bow· 
man Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777 (1976). 
158. See Part III.C infra. 
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action programs for women, like that in Johnson. Since gender dis-
crimination is given only intermediate level scrutiny under the Consti-
tution, will the Court treat gender-preferential affirmative action plans 
differently from similar plans for minorities?159 Or will it insist on 
strict scrutiny for such plans, as the Solicitor General implied when he 
argued that Title VII should require strict scrutiny for both race- and 
gender-conscious plans and that Title VII and constitutional standards 
should be the same?160 This would really be "anomalous," for "dis-
crimination" against males would be treated more harshly than dis-
crimination against females! 
Strict scrutiny for gender-preferences is obviously unlikely, 161 but 
if intermediate (or less) scrutiny is used for gender-conscious affirma-
tive action under the Constitution, then these remedial plans for 
women will appear to be treated more leniently than those for 
blacks, 162 even though the history of discrimination against blacks is 
indeed more tragic, and the problems of opening opportunities for mi-
norities seem much more intractable.163 
B. Discrimination as a Compelling Purpose 
1. Societal Discrimination 
Although all members of the Court, except perhaps Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, seem to accept the eradication of dis-
crimination and its effects as a compelling purpose for race- or gender-
conscious action, a majority of the Court seems to reject eliminating 
the effects of societal discrimination as an adequate predicate. The 
159. For an example of such treatment, see Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco, 
813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987). 
160. See Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3050 n.47; see also Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6 n.4, 9-10 n.5, Johnson (No. 85-1129). Will the Solici-
tor General also insist on strict scrutiny in cases involving discrimination against women? See id. 
at 9-10 n.5; see also Brief for Petitioner at 22-23, Johnson. 
161. For example in Bakke, Justice Powell rejected the intermediate scrutiny test for race-
conscious affirmative action because he did not consider the history of gender discrimination to 
be as lengthy or as tragic as the history of race prejudice, or the analytic problems for affirmative 
action in gender cases as great as those in racial cases. 438 U.S. at 302-03. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist has gone so far as to suggest that gender classifications in general, particularly those involv-
ing discrimination against men, are entitled only to rational basis scrutiny. Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 221-22 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Whether Chief Justice Rehnquist will main-
tain that position when the alleged discrimination arises in an affirmative action context is dubi-
ous: since United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), he has not voted to sustain any 
affirmative action plan. 
162. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 941-42 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
163. Women seem to be doing much better than blacks. See, e.g., Enrollment of Minorities in 
Colleges Stagnating, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1987, § l, at 1, col. 1 (black enrollment in university 
admissions declining). 
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same Justices who insisted on strict scrutiny in Wygant for constitu-
tional cases take this position and Justice Scalia would almost cer-
tainly vote with them on this issue. Although Justice White, a co-
author of the joint Bakke opinion which explicitly accepted societal 
discrimination, took no position on this issue in Wygant, in Firefight-
ers he expressed a willingness to accept remedial affirmative action by 
an employer "only as a remedy for its own prior discriminatory prac-
tices disfavoring members of that race."164 He thus seems ready to 
make a bloc of four. Whether a majority can be mustered for this view 
will depend on Justice Powell's successor, Justice Kennedy. 
Justice Powell, who himself was the leading proponent for this po-
sition as well as for the insistence on strict scrutiny, discussed the mat-
ter twice, and in somewhat different ways. In Wygant he wrote: 
This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone is sufficient 
to justify a racial classification. Rather, the Court has insisted upon 
some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved 
.... The role model theory [adopted by the lower courts] allows the 
Board to engage in discriminatory hiring and layoff practices long past 
the point required by any legitimate remedial purpose .... Societal dis-
crimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a ra-
cially classified remedy. The role model theory announced by the 
District Court and the resultant holding typify this indefiniteness. There 
are numerous explanations for a disparity between the percentage of mi-
nority students and the percentage of minority faculty, many of them 
completely unrelated to discrimination of any kind.165 
Eight years earlier, in Bakke, he had offered a somewhat related 
reason. In responding to the joint opinion he commented, "No one 
denies the regrettable fact that there has been societal discrimination 
in this country against various racial and ethnic groups."166 He re-
jected, however, the contention that 
but for this discrimination by society at large, Bakke "would have failed 
to qualify for admission" because Negro applicants - nothing is said 
about Asians ... - would have made better scores. Not one word in the 
record supports this conclusion, and the authors of the [joint] opinion 
offer no standard for courts to use in applying such a presumption of 
causation to other racial or ethnic classifications. 167 
None of Justice Powell's arguments stand up. In the first place, 
the Court did uphold a racial classification in Fullilove without a find-
ing of discrimination by the actor - in that case, the United States 
164. Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3081 (White, J., dissenting). 
165. 106 S. Ct. at 1847-48. Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Powell in rejecting societal 
discrimination as a predicate. 106 S. Ct. at 1854. 
166. 438 U.S. at 296 n.36. 
167. 438 U.S. at 296 n.36. 
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Congress - as Justice Stewart pointed out in his dissent. 168 In Fulli-
love Justice Powell himself relied on discrimination by broad social 
forces, not including the actor: the legislative history he cited and 
quoted, focused on "a business system which has traditionally ex-
cluded measurable minority participation."169 And Chief Justice Bur-
ger noted that United Jewish Organizations v. Carey 170 allowed a state 
to use racial criteria to ensure compliance with voting rights legisla-
tion "even though the state action does not entail the remedy of a 
constitutional violation" by anyone. 171 
The rejection of societal discrimination as a predicate is also incon-
sistent with Justice Powell's approval in Bakke of many affirmative 
action programs on the ground that they were all legitimately predi-
cated on prior discrimination. The plans adopted under Executive Or-
der 11246 certainly didn't involve any individualized misconduct, for 
the Order - a governmental act mandating such plans - is not lim-
ited to the bad actors.172 Furthermore, statutory preferences for 
women have often been constitutionally justified as compensation for 
long-standing societal discrimination against them. 173 
Perhaps even more significant is the fact that both Weber and 
Johnson allow voluntary racial classifications under Title VII without 
a prior finding of discrimination by the actor or even an "arguable 
violation."174 The Weber trial court had found and it was "all but 
concede[d]" that Kaiser had not been guilty of any discriminatory 
practices and in Johnson there was a similar finding. 175 Weber stressed 
the blatant societal discrimination against blacks that was the impetus 
for Title VII, 176 focusing on the exclusionary practices of craft unions, 
168. 448 U.S. at 528; see also Cox, supra note 95, at 95-96. 
169. H.R. REP. No. 1791, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 182 (1977), quoted in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 
505. 
170. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
171. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483. 
172. See Cox, supra note 95, at 95-96. 
173. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 
(1977); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 365 (joint opinion). 
174. See Weber, 443 U.S. 192, 212 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (rejecting an "arguable 
violation" as a prerequisite to a voluntary program). 
175. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1977). The 
Supreme Court did not question this finding but noted only that "blacks had long been excluded 
from craft unions," which prevented formation of a pool of qualified black craft workers. 443 
U.S. at 198. The Court also stressed that the employer need not even be "motivated by a fear of 
liability," citing legislative history indicating that Congress's goal in adopting Title VII was to 
"open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally 
closed to them." 443 U.S. at 208 n.8 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Senator 
Humphrey)). 
176. 443 U.S. at 202-03. The Solicitor General recognized this in Johnson but concluded 
that it therefore could not be a predicate for a remedy, stating that: 
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who were not before the Court, and whose practices had segregated 
and closed the crafts to blacks.177 In his important concurrence,1' 8 
Justice Blackmun also pointed to "a societal history of purposeful ex-
clusion," including "segregated and inferior trade schools for blacks in 
Louisiana," citing a Civil Rights Commission Report. 179 
In Johnson, there was even less. Whereas one could point specifi-
cally to discrimination by the craft unions to explain the absence of 
blacks in the Kaiser craft force in Weber, there was no such ready 
explanation in Johnson, and there was a similar finding of no discrimi-
nation by the employer.180 
it was precisely this tragic history of blatant societal discrimination against blacks and other 
minorities which served as the primary impetus behind Congress's decision to outlaw differ-
ential treatment of any employee on the basis of race or gender. Congress cannot be taken 
to have contemplated abandoning this nondiscrimination principle whenever an employer 
maintained that it was engaging in such discriminatory treatment in order to ameliorate the 
effects of societal discrimination. For given the clear presence of the effects of societal dis-
crimination in 1964 (and today), this would mean that Congress intended to permit discrim-
ination designed to benefit minorities and women in every instance and thus to render its 
ban on discrimination against "any individual" a nullity from its inception. 
Brieffor the United States at 14 n.7, Johnson. But as the Court has noted many times, and not 
just in the discrimination context, remedies can encompass measures that might not be accepta-
ble in themselves. See Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1078 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring), and cases cited 
therein. 
177. 443 U.S. at 198-99, 208. 
178. It was relied on frequently in the Court's Johnson opinion. 
179. 443 U.S. at 212 & n.* (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice White in Firefighters read 
Weber to be a case where "the company's prior discriminatory conduct provided the predicate 
for" the remedy. 106 S. Ct. at 3081. But, as noted in the text, the lower court found, and it was 
"all but concede[d]," that Kaiser had not been guilty of any discrimination. Weber, 563 F.2d at 
224. Kaiser might have lost a suit against it for its own discriminatory practices, see 443 U.S. at 
210 (Blackmun, J., concurring), but that is not how any court framed the issue in Weber. 
In Johnson, Justice White modified his "understanding of Weber," casting it as a case where 
there was "intentional and systematic exclusion of blacks by the employer and the unions from 
certain job categories." Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1465 (White, J., dissenting). But if he was refer-
ring to the craft unions, they were not before the Court and were not volunteering to do any-
thing. 
Weber, incidentally, should have been a particularly strong precedent for Wygant, for in both 
cases there was the specter of successful litigation, some evidence of discrimination by the actor 
(though not relied on by the courts), and plans justified by the actor on other grounds. 
180. Justice Scalia actually suggested that the absence of women from Santa Clara's Skilled 
Job Category was explained not by discrimination, but instead by self-exclusion by women be-
cause they had not wanted these jobs. He even asserted that Santa Clara County believed this, 
but the plan suggests otherwise, as shown by the material he quoted: "Many women are not 
strongly motivated to seek employment in job classifications where they have not been tradition· 
ally employed because of the limited opportunities that have existed in the past for them to work in 
such classifications." Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1467 (emphasis added). The same could be said of 
blacks and other excluded groups; indeed, one of the purposes of affirmative action is to en-
courage disfavored groups to apply for jobs from which they have previously been discouraged. 
Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3051. Further, Justice O'Connor pointed to numerous refer-
ences in the testimony indicating a concern with discrimination and its effects. Johnson, 107 S. 
Ct. at 1463-64. 
Justice Scalia's assertion that the skilled and other job categories had been "traditionally 
segregated" not because of societal discrimination, but because "women themselves" don't want 
that work, Johnson, 101 S. Ct. at 1471, may be true sometimes or even often, but it is impossible 
to tell. Certainly Justice Scalia doesn't know. We do know that discrimination is responsible for 
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Obviously, more underlies the rejection of societal discrimination 
than precedent. One reason suggested by Justice Powell in Wygant is 
that "the role model theory employed by the District Court has no 
logical stopping point."181 But nothing in the concept of societal dis-
crimination requires the use of the "role model theory," the educa-
tional validity of which is itself a controversial matter. 182 That theory 
is not designed to deal with employment discrimination but, like the 
ethnic diversity goal in Bakke, is aimed at an educational purpose. 
Insofar as the goal of a plan is to eradicate the specific employment 
effects of societal discrimination, the conventional standard for goal-
setting and evaluation could have been used to remedy the employ-
ment problem in Wygant: the achievement of a work force composi-
tion commensurate with the proportion of qualified minorities in the 
relevant community.1s3 
The reason for rejecting societal discrimination as a predicate for 
affirmative action suggested by Justice Powell in Bakke seems even 
a great deal of underrepresentation in what have usually been called men's jobs. The experience 
of the last 15 years in construction, firefighting, police, and many other traditional male jobs 
shows that when women are given a chance to get these jobs, they rush to them. Brief Amici 
Curiae for NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund at 59-60, Johnson (No. 85-1129). Nor is 
this anything new. During World War II, many women worked very happily in defense plants. 
It was made clear to them, however, that theirs were only temporary jobs. As soon as the war 
ended and the men returned, many of the women were forced to leave the jobs. S. ROTHMAN, 
WOMAN'S PROPER PLACE 221-24 (1978); see also W. CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN 174-81 
(1972) (women lost many of the better-paying positions, though they remained in the work force 
to a much greater extent than before the war); Freeman, Book Review, THE NATION, Apr. 25, 
1987, at 550 (reviewing R. MILKMAN, GENDER AT WORK (1987)). 
The burden of proof should not be on those seeking to show that the exclusion was the result 
of discrimination. There is enough of a history of discrimination against women to presume that 
in many if not most contexts it was discrimination rather than self-selection that produced the 
exclusion. The Court seems to have adopted this position, Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1450, and it is 
one basis for the heightened scrutiny given intentional gender classifications in constitutional 
cases. Such a presumption is particularly appropriate when we deal not with a specific job but 
with a broad category like "Service and Maintenance," "Skilled Craft Worker," "Professional," 
"Officials and Administrators," or "Technicians," each of which encompasses many different 
jobs, and in each of which women were substantially underrepresented in Santa Clara County's 
work force. 
181. 106 S. Ct. at 1847. 
182. See Clague, Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans in Public Education: Anticipating a 
Supreme Court Decision, 14 J.L. & EDUC. 309, 344-48 (1985) (criticizing theory that black teach-
ers are critical to serve as role models that spur black children's scholastic performance as lack-
ing an empirical basis). The school board's own lawyer in Wygant had grave doubts about the 
"role model" theory, and suggested that the lower court had meant only that an integrated stu-
dent body needs an integrated faculty. Wagner, Affirmative Action at the Crossroads, A.B.A. J., 
May 1, 1986, at 38, 40. The problem of measuring any correlation between an integrated faculty 
and the improved performance of black children, of course, persists. 
183. Cf. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1860 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Johnson and 
Weber, where the comparison for determining whether a job classification is traditionally segre-
gated is with the overall workforce, but the goals can be measured otherwise. Weber, 443 U.S. at 
214 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1452-53 n.10. In Johnson, moreover, the 
goals were adjusted to take availability into account. 107 S. Ct. at 1447. 
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weaker. While admitting that "there has been societal discrimination 
... against various racial and ethnic groups,"184 he ignored the joint 
opinion's observation that "substantial, chronic minority under-
representation ... is a product of past racial discrimination,"185 and 
instead attacked the opinion's contention that "but for this discrimina-
tion by society at large, Bakke 'would have failed to qualify for admis-
sion' because [minority] applicants ... would have made better 
scores." 186 
The conclusion that societal discrimination helped Alan Bakke in 
particular does seem speculative, especially in view of Bakke's own 
high scores. But that is hardly relevant when dealing with large 
groups of whites and blacks, with "chronic minority underrepresenta-
tion." It is inevitable that at least some whites would not have had 
their jobs, seniority, or other privileges but for the discrimination. 187 
Chief Justice Burger said as much himself in Fullilove 188 in an opinion 
that Justice Powell joined, and the Paradise plurality opinion made the 
same point. 189 After all, one of the obvious purposes of this prior soci-
etal discrimination was to deny minorities a fair share of jobs and 
other benefits, thus leaving to dominant majority members a larger 
share than they would have had without the discrimination. 190 
This, of course, does not deal with the problems associated with a 
remedy that takes its toll on particular individuals who may them-
selves either be guiltless or in no way beneficiaries of the prior discrim-
ination, the problem raised by Justice Powell in Bakke. But that is not 
a problem peculiar to accepting societal discrimination as a predicate 
for an affirmative action remedy, for it arises even when the em-
ployer's own discrimination is the predicate. 
The morality of imposing such a burden on innocent employees 
because of a particular individual employer's past discriminatory con-
duct seems especially questionable. It is one thing to make a group of 
largely innocent people pay for the solutions to problems that are 
broadly societal in nature - we all have to do that constantly, 
184. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296 n.36; see also Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1848. 
185. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 366 (joint opinion). 
186. 438 U.S. at 296 n.36. 
187. Bok, Goals Aren't Quotas, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1986, at 15, col. 3. 
188. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484-85. 
189. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1078 n.2. 
190. Justice Powell had also raised difficulties with applying societal discrimination to other 
ethnic groups claiming to have been discriminated against. If the predicate of societal discrimi· 
nation affecting the jobs in question can be shown with respect to these other groups, and if they 
have either sued or otherwise seek preferences, there is no analytic reason why that discrimina· 
tion should not be similarly recognized. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 n.35 (joint opinion). 
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whether in the form of taxes for schools not attended by any of our 
children, involuntary service in the armed forces, or losing seniority to 
veterans or others with preferences. And most members of the major-
ity probably have benefited directly or indirectly from societal preju-
dice, even if the chain of causation may be hard to show in particular 
cases. It seems much less justifiable for one person to have to bear the 
burden of a remedy for another individual's misconduct. If only the 
employer discriminated against black job applicants, why should fu-
ture white applicants in no way benefited by his discrimination bear 
the brunt of a remedy for his misconduct?191 
It may be argued that insofar as Weber and Johnson are predicated 
on the "tightrope" of facing "liability for past discrimination against 
blacks, and ... liability to whites for any voluntary preferences,"192 
remedying societal discrimination would indeed seem irrelevant. 193 
But as will be noted below, and as Weber plainly shows, in many cases 
societal discrimination becomes relevant to race/ gender preferences 
because there is a lack of evidence of discrimination which, in turn, 
results not from the absence of discrimination but because neither the 
challengers to the plan nor the defendant have any interest in proving 
it. 194 Also, the confusion created by Justices O'Connor and White 
over the existence of discrimination in Weber and Johnson 195 is 
enough to justify the fears of almost any employer with an unrepre-
sentative work force that he might be liable for a discrimination suit 
by minorities. Thus the "tightrope" problem remains a real one. 
It seems particularly anomalous to interpret Title VII and the 
Constitution so as to allow private employers to respond to societal 
discrimination, but not to allow public employers to do so. A public 
agency is supported by the community and, almost by definition, is 
supposed to deal with societally relevant issues. Also, if the commu-
nity does not like the agency's response to the societal problem; the 
community's executive or legislative representatives can undo the re-
191. The situation is somewhat different where union discrimination is concerned because it 
may be said that such discrimination was done on behalf of the members, but most cases involve 
employers. 
192. Weber, 443 U.S. at 210 (Blackmun, J.). 
193. The Solicitor General so argued. See Amicus Brief for the United States at 8, Johnson 
(No. 85-1129). 
194. This may also have been the case in Johnson, see Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 
8a-9a, especially since the selection process by which Johnson was originally chosen - the three-
member panel - could have been challenged on Title VII grounds had the panel's recommenda-
tion not been overruled. See text at notes 69-86 supra. Moreover, both the Court of Appeals and 
Justice O'Connor suggested that a prima facie case had been shown. Johnson, 770 F.2d at 758 
n.5. 
195. See the Johnson opinions of O'Connor, White & Brennan, JJ., 107 S. Ct. at 1453, 1463, 
1470. 
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sponse, which it cannot do with the private employer's solution to 
such problems. 
The refusal to rely on societal discrimination seems especially un-
wise where the discrimination may be traced to a specific third person 
or group not before the court with whom the defendant must continue 
to do business. In Weber, for example, the employer had to work with 
the craft unions, which was the group guilty of discrimination; in Ful-
lilove and other government contract cases, the public entity must con-
tinue to draw on a construction industry permeated with long-
standing discriminatory practices. If the employer or public entity 
cannot adopt an affirmative action plan and continues to do business 
with the industry, as it almost certainly must, then the employer or 
public entity will itself be participating in and perpetuating the dis-
crimination, whether it wants to or not.196 
The majority's veto of public plans to deal with societal discrimi-
nation also raises doubts about the commitment of the conservative 
bloc of Justices to judicial restraint, a doctrine they are particularly 
prone to invoke against the Court's efforts to protect individual rights 
in this and other contexts.197 As Justice Powell himself observed, it is 
rare for the Court to second-guess the purpose for an official classifica-
tion - the issues usually revolve around means198 - especially when 
there is no doubt, as Justice Powell conceded in Bakke, that societal 
discrimination is indeed a serious problem. Why should that judicial 
deference not hold equally here? After all, no one seriously doubts 
that racism has been pervasive and often unconscious199 in many state 
and local practices and institutions, and that its effects are evident in 
many superficially neutral settings.200 Local agencies, in particular, 
196. This is the inevitable result of four post-Wygant court of appeals decisions that struck 
down local affirmative action plans in government contracting. Associated Gen. Contractors v. 
City & County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987); J.A. Croson Co. v. City of 
Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987) (jurisdictional statement filed Dec. 17, 1987); Michi-
gan Road Builders Assn. v. Milliken, No. 86-1239 (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 1987) (not final until expira-
tion of rehearing period); J. Edinger & Son Inc. v. City of Louisville, 802 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 
1986). 
197. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), provides an especially good recent 
example. 
198. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1850 n.7. 
199. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
200. The seminal article on the inadequacy of the Court's traditional insistence on individual 
liability is Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A 
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1975). See also Marshall, A 
Comment on the Non-discrimination Principle in a "Nation of Minorities," 93 YALE L.J, 1006 
(1984). The point is made specifically in the affirmative action context by Sullivan, Sins of Dis-
crimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986). See also Fiss, 
supra note 125, at 146 (noting the clash between individualism and reliance on societal 
discrimination). 
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are often in a very good position to know this, thus minimizing the 
problem with "competence."201 
2. Discrimination and Statistical Disparity 
Despite her explicit rejection of societal discrimination as an ac-
ceptable constitutional predicate for a voluntary affirmative action 
plan, Justice O'Connor's approach may in practice be equivalent to 
this. Since four Justices have consistently maintained that societal dis-
crimination should be enough, this makes a majority. 
The verbal difference was set out in Johnson, where both the ma-
jority and the O'Connor concurrence drew a sharp contrast between 
Johnson's Title VII interpretation and Wygant's constitutional analy-
sis. The majority held that Title VII required only a showing of a 
"manifest imbalance" in a "traditionally segregated job category." 
This "manifest imbalance need not . . . support a prima facie case 
against the employer,"202 and an employer need not "point to its own 
prior discriminatory practices nor even to evidence of an 'arguable vio-
lation.' "203 Drawing on Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Weber, 
the Court went on to point out certain analytic differences between the 
two standards. 204 
Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, called the Court's rule "ex-
pansive and ill-defined," and insisted that the Wygant criteria govern: 
"[T]he employer must have had a firm basis for believing that remedial 
action was required." This can be shown if the employer can point to 
enough evidence of discrimination to justify a prima facie case that he 
has violated the law.2os 
Yet the differences between the Brennan and O'Connor positions 
are more apparent than real. Justice O'Connor's prima facie ap-
proach, as applied by her in Wygant and Johnson, as well as her read-
ing of Weber, will usually produce the same results as the majority's 
"societal" approach. 
Ever since Bakke, it has been undisputed that either "constitu-
tional or statutory violations" can serve as an adequate predicate for 
public or private affirmative action. 206 A statutory violation can be 
201. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309 (agency remedying discrimination must have the compe-
tence to do so). 
202. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1451. 
203. 107 S. Ct. at 1451. 
204. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1452 n.10. 
205. 107 S. Ct. at 1461 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
206. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302-03 (Powell, J.). The discrimination in Southern Ill. Builders' 
Assn. v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972), and Associated Gen. Contractors v. Altshuler, 
490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973) (cited by Justice Powell in Bakke as examples of racial hiring prefer-
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either a case of disparate impact from a particular practice or pol-
icy, 207 or disparate treatment, including a pattern or practice of such 
disparate treatment.208 But a "disparate impact" from a particular 
practice, and "intent" for purposes of a disparate treatment pattem-
or-practice case, can each be shown by a statistical disparity. As Jus-
tice O'Connor pointed out in Wygant, if the proportion of racial mi-
norities in the work force is substantially below that of the appropriate 
labor pool, a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination is made 
out,209 which is enough to justify an affirmative action plan for Justice 
O'Connor. 
Nor is Justice O'Connor alone in her constitutional analysis. In 
Wygant, the Court was almost unanimous: as Justice Powell put it, 
race-preferential remedies could be justified by an after-the-fact deter-
mination that "the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its con-
clusion that remedial action was necessary"210 - no formal 
preliminary finding is necessary. Moreover, as an example of a proper 
plan he cited Hazelwood School District v. United States, 211 which re-
lied on a statistical disparity between the employer's minority work 
ences justified by previous discrimination), could only be statutory, because it involved discrimi· 
nation "by the industries affected" - private contractors. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 301-02. 
207. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). A "business necessity" defense for an 
employment practice can be raised. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308 n.44. This is probably not too 
relevant for present purposes, however; for if all that need be shown is a "firm basis" for believing 
there is a violation, then a statistical showing of disparate impact would suffice. The same reason· 
ing would explain why the possibility of rebutting an inference of discrimination in a pattern or 
practice case is not material. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309-10, 
(1977); see also Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1856 ("In 'reverse discrimination' suits, as in any other suit, 
it is the plaintiffs who must bear the burden of demonstrating that their rights have been vio· 
lated.'') (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
208. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-09 (1977); International 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977). 
209. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1856; see also Weber, 443 U.S. at 198, 208. 
In Bushey v. New York State Civil Serv. Commn., 469 U.S. 1117 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari), the three most conservative members of the Court read 
Weber as requiring only a statistical imbalance. The virtual identity between Weber and the 
O'Connor formulation in Johnson was noted by Judge Silberman in Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 
73, 85-86 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Silberman, J., concurring). 
210. 106 S. Ct. at 1848. The Solicitor General argued that before an affirmative action plan 
could be adopted there had to be a judicial finding of past discrimination. Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 29-30, Wygant. The petitioners would have 
accepted an administrative finding, Brief for Petitioners at 12-13, Wygant, but the Solicitor Gen· 
eral seemed to rule out an administrative finding "by a state or local entity .•. because, among 
other things, the states are not granted the enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.'' Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae supporting Petitioners at 29-30, Wy· 
gant. (So much for the Administration's vaunted concern for federalism and states' rights.) The 
Court rejected both positions for the obvious reason that such a requirement "would severely 
undermine public employers' incentive to meet voluntarily their civil rights obligations." Wy· 
gant, 106 S. Ct. at 1855 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Powell's Bakke opinion had raised 
the possibility of such a requirement. 438 U.S. at 307-10. 
211. 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
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force and the minority proportion of the relevant applicant pool as a 
valid "justification for, and the limitation on, a State's adoption of 
race-based remedies."212 Justice O'Connor summarized it this way: 
[D]emonstrable evidence of a disparity between the percentage of quali-
fied blacks on a school's teaching staff and the percentage of qualified 
minorities in the relevant labor pool sufficient to support a prima facie 
Title VII pattern or practice claim by minority teachers would lend a 
compelling basis for a competent authority such as the School Board to 
conclude that implementation of a voluntary affirmative action plan is 
appropriate to remedy apparent prior employment discrimination.213 
Thus, statistical disparities are enough to establish a prima facie 
case and will be enough to provide an employer with a "firm basis for 
believing that remedial action is required."214 This is virtually the 
same as the Johnson/Weber prerequisite of a "manifest imbalance" in 
a "traditionally segregated job classification."2 1s 
The specific differences between the Johnson majority and the 
O'Connor approach discussed by Justice Brennan are also more minor 
than they appear. Although Justice Brennan seemed to argue at one 
point that the Wygant prima facie case would have to consider the 
disparity between the employer's work force representation and the 
available qualified pool, whereas the Johnson "manifest imbalance" 
test compares the representation in employer's force with that of the 
entire work force,216 at another point he indicated that the latter com-
parison applies only to entry level or training positions. Further, Jus-
tice Brennan cited Hazelwood for the proposition that where special 
qualifications are concerned, the "manifest imbalance" would be mea-
212. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1847. 
213. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1856 (emphasis added); see also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 n.20. 
214. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1853; see also 106 S. Ct. at 1856 ("[W]hen the Board introduces 
its statistical proof as evidence of its remedial putpose, [it] thereby suppl[ies] the court with the 
means for determining that the Board had a firm basis for concluding that remedial action was 
appropriate .... "). That the defense might be able to rebut the prima facie case will not normally 
be relevant for the reasons discussed in note 207 supra, though there may be instances where a 
valid defense is so obvious that the plaintiffs will be able to show that there was clearly no 
discrimination. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3061-63 (dissenting opinions of O'Connor & 
White, JJ.). The idea that a statistical disparity is enough for the adoption of a voluntary plan 
because the disparity is enough for a prima facie case, is not new. The lower courts have all been 
applying it for some time, with little disagreement. See, e.g., Kirkland v. New York State Dept. 
of Correctional Serv., 711F.2d1117, 1130 (2d Cir. 1983); Bushey v. New York State Civ. Serv. 
Commn., 733 F.2d 220, 228 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1117 (1985); Setser v. Novack 
Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 968 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981); Guardians Assn. v. 
Civil Serv. Commn., 630 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981). 
215. The difference between a disparate treatment pattern or practice situation and a dispa-
rate impact case is not important here, for in either case there is a statutory violation, and an 
employer can rely on data showing either a disparate impact from a practice or an overall under-
representation in a job category. 
216. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1452 n.10. 
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sured by the pool of those specially qualified,217 as in the O'Connor 
formulation. 
The only significant difference could be the insistence by both Jus-
tices O'Connor and Powell in Wygant (as well as Justice White and 
the Justices concurring with Powell in Wygant) that there be strong 
evidence or a firm basis for a finding of prior discrimination "by the 
governmental unit involved"218 - the employer's "own discrimina-
tory conduct," as Justice Brennan put it. That could be a very real 
difference, but neither Weber nor Johnson would seem to meet this 
standard: in Weber there was an undisputed finding of no discrimina-
tion by Kaiser, and in Johnson, there was a similar finding with only 
some mild dispute.219 Yet in both cases Justice O'Connor found a 
prima facie case satisfying her test because in both there was a signifi-
cant statistical disparity in a traditionally segregated job category. If 
her test is satisfied in these two cases, despite findings to the contrary, 
will it not always be where the majority's test of "manifest imbalance" 
in "traditionally segregated job classifications" is met? Indeed, since 
her test does not require "traditional" segregation, but only a statisti-
cal disparity, it may reach even further than the majority's. 
It should therefore not be too difficult to respond to an affirmative 
action challenge with a good factual showing of a disparate impact 
from a particular practice or a large disparity between the work force 
composition and the qualified applicant pool.220 Serious problems are 
likely to arise only when there is confusion as to what must be proven. 
In Wygant, for example, there was enough evidence of prior discrimi-
nation by the Jackson School Board to meet the "strong evidence" or 
"firm basis" test, because the statistical disparity and other evidence 
were sufficient to warrant a preliminary judgment by the State Civil 
Rights Commission that the Board had engaged in discriminatory 
practices.221 But as Justice O'Connor explained, the majority had 
problems with accepting this as an adequate predicate because on 
217. In support of the distinction, Justice Brennan also noted that Justice Blackmun's Weber 
concurrence recognized that the Court was not insisting on an "arguable violation," but was 
accepting something less. 107 S. Ct. at 1451. Blackmun observed, however, that even an "argua· 
ble violation" would probably focus on the "arguable," and not on the violation, and would not 
be hard to prove by a "mere disparity." Weber. 443 U.S. at 213-14. 
218. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1847. 
219. See Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 13a, Johnson (No. 85-1129). 
220. The usual concern about such an admission - liability to minorities hurt by such a 
practice - may be small, given the passage of time and statute of limitations problems, as well as 
the limited nature of what must be shown. This is different, of course, from an admission when 
minority workers or the authorities directly challenge the practice itself, where the risk of liabil· 
ity is substantial. 
221. See text at notes 17-19 supra; Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1854 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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summary judgment motions the lower courts "did not focus on the 
School Board's unquestionably compelling interest in remedying its 
apparent prior discrimination," but only on whether there had to be a 
formal "finding of past discrimination before or at the time of the in-
stitution of the plan."222 To avoid this latter issue, the lower courts 
ignored this "unquestionably compelling interest" and relied on the 
societal discrimination and role model theory. It was thus the proce-
dural posture and the inadequate record that defeated the Jackson 
School Board on the discrimination issue, though it might have lost on 
the layoffs anyway, as Justice Powell noted.223 
Justice O'Connor's approach tries to have it both ways.224 On the 
one hand, it insists on some form of individual fault as a predicate for 
even voluntary affirmative action. On the other hand, it proposes a 
prima facie case test which is satisfied by a statistical disparity that not 
only produces the same result as an explicit societal discrimination 
standard, but was originally adopted in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 225 
and elsewhere partly because of the existence of societal discrimina-
222. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1854. 
223. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1849. 
In Johnson the government sought to impose the burden of persuasion on the defendant 
employer to justify use of an affirmative action plan even when there is "apparent discrimina-
tion." Brief for the United States as Arnicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17, Johnson. Jus-
tice Powell's and Justice O'Connor's opinions in Wygant seem to indicate that the burden stays 
on the challenger. As Justice O'Connor put it: 
[W]hen the Board introduces its statistical proof as evidence of its remedial purpose, thereby 
supplying the court with the means for determining that the Board had a firm basis for 
concluding that remedial action was appropriate, it is incumbent upon the nonminority 
teachers to prove their case; they continue to bear the ultimate burden of persuading the 
court that the Board's evidence did not support an inference of prior discrimination and 
thus a remedial purpose, or that the plan instituted on the basis of this evidence was not 
sufficiently "narrowly tailored." Only by meeting this burden could the plaintiffs establish a 
violation of their constitutional rights, and thereby defeat the presumption that the Board's 
assertedly remedial action based on the statistical evidence was justified. 
106 S. Ct. at 1856. 
224. Justice Scalia criticized Justice O'Connor's approach as a mere "half-way house" be-
tween the majority's "leaving employers scot-free to discriminate" and truly barring discrimina-
tion. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1470 n.4. A statistical disparity, no matter how great, cannot 
establish a "firm basis" for belief in the mind of the employer, argued Scalia, because the em-
ployer may know a nondiscriminatory reason for the disparity. 107 S. Ct. at 1470 n.4. If the 
Scalia analysis is sound, O'Connor's approach would also preclude an affirmative action consent 
decree in which an employer disclaimed discrimination. 
Justice Scalia's critique may, however, misconstrue the O'Connor standard. It calls not for a 
bona fide or other form of subjective belief, but only for a "firm basis for believing," which 
literally refers solely to the objective facts, not the subjective belief. Compare the Court's similar 
approach in criminal cases, such as United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and United States 
v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978). The latter construction brings the O'Connor standard even closer to 
the Johnson-majority approach. 
Justice Scalia's other criticism of the O'Connor standard is that the Santa Clara plan was not 
designed to remedy discrimination, but Justice O'Connor's opinion cites evidence to the con-
trary. 107 S. Ct. at 1465. 
225. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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tion. Intent and its corollary, moral fault, are dispensed with in statu-
tory cases on the theory that a neutral or even well-intentioned 
practice should not be allowed to build upon this nation's historical 
societal discrimination to produce discriminatory effects. Under a dis-
parate impact definition of discrimination, an individual can be 
charged under Title VII without any moral fault on his part, even if 
the employer has "good intent."226 Although the discrimination is at-
tributed to the actor, it is hardly the kind of fault to justify the serious 
sanctions that can follow a finding of violation. 
3. Of ''Egregiousness" and ''Recalcitrance" 
In an effort to convert a stinging rebuff227 into at least a partial 
victory, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds tried to paint the 
Court's 1986 rulings as "hardly ever" allowing racially preferential 
remedies. According to him, the Court's reference to the "use of 
[such] ... remedies to correcting 'flagrant and egregious' acts of 'per-
vasive' discrimination," means that such remedies are probably re-
served henceforth for instances of "intentional discrimination (not 
discriminatory effects)."228 And he construed Sheet Metal Workers as 
making "[s]uch preferences ... available, according to a majority of 
the Court, as a last resort ... only when it is essential to compel com-
pliance by recalcitrant companies or unions .... "229 
Some of the Justices' language backs up at least part of this claim. 
In Sheet Metal Workers, Justice Brennan did say that in most cases the 
court "need only order the employer or union to cease engaging in 
discriminatory practices and award make-whole relief to individuals 
victimized by those practices";230 Justice Powell referred to "particu-
larly egregious conduct";231 Justice O'Connor insisted that "creation 
of racial preferences by courts ... must be done sparingly";232 and 
Justice White referred to Sheet Metal Workers as "one of those un-
226. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; see also Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 70 (1972) (the 
defense of job-relatedness has no necessary connection with intent). 
227. See Firefighters v. Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. at 3071 n.6, 3073 n.9; Sheet Metal Workers, 106 
S. Ct. at 3034 n.24. 
228. Reynolds A.B.A. Speech, supra note 110, at 5 (emphasis in original). His spokesman 
Mark Disler described the Court as ruling that "race-and-gender-preferential employment poli-
cies are hardly ever permissible even as remedies for the most egregious discrimination." N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 2, 1986, at 22, col. 3 (Letter to the Editor from Mark R. Disler, Deputy Attorney 
General). 
229. Reynolds A.B.A. Speech, supra note 110, at 5 (emphasis in original). 
230. 106 S. Ct. at 3050; see also 106 S. Ct. at 3050 n.48 (commending the Courts of Appeals 
for their "cautious approach"). 
231. 106 S. Ct. at 3054 (Powell, J., concurring). 
232. 106 S. Ct. at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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usual cases where nonvictims of discrimination were entitled to a mea-
sure of ... [affirmative action] relief."233 
But that is all. By contrast, as discussed above, the Court made it 
clear as early as Bakke that "constitutional or statutory violations" 
would justify such remedies, 234 and a statutory violation obviously 
need not be predicated on intentional discrimination. 
In any event, Reynolds's suggestion could hardly apply to volun-
tary plans, even under Wygant's insistence on a firm basis. A "recalci-
trant" employer is hardly likely to adopt a voluntary plan. Even with 
respect to mandatory plans, "recalcitrance" may have more flexibility 
than is indicated by the kind of defiance that Local 28 displayed. Sev-
eral of the lower court decisions cited by Justices Powell and Brennan 
based findings of "recalcitrance" solely on the defendant's failure to 
voluntarily remedy the discrimination and resulting employment im-
balance,235 a far cry from Local 28's behavior and something that is 
probably not unusual. Relying on this kind of employer failure is also 
consistent with Justice Brennan's observation that affirmative action 
may be necessary in order to remedy any "lingering effects" of 
discrimination. 236 
Mr. Reynolds's other limiting interpretation of the discrimination 
predicate, that the discrimination must be "egregious" or "flagrant," 
also seems unjustified. For one thing, these are extremely subjective 
concepts with which to determine liability. Even with so persistent an 
offender as Local 28, Justices White and O'Connor, for example, did 
not think its failure to meet the district court's mandate warranted the 
contempt order that produced a race-preferential remedy,237 though 
five other Justices did. 
Mr. Reynolds's approach would also discourage virtually all vol-
untary plans (which may not have been unintended), for what em-
ployer will be willing to defend a suit challenging a voluntary 
preference with an admission of not just the statistical disparity neces-
sary for a prima facie case, but with additional evidence showing an 
"egregious" or "flagrant" violation? That would certainly invite dis-
crimination suits by minorities or women. 
Finally, Mr. Reynolds's concentration on the references to "egre-
233. 106 S. Ct. at 3062 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
234. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302-03 (emphasis added). 
235. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 920 (1976); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Commn., 482 F.2d 1333, 
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975). 
236. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3050. 
237. 106 S. Ct. at 3061-63 (O'Connor & White, JJ., dissenting). 
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gious" discrimination also overlooks Justice Brennan's two other justi-
fications for race-conscious remedies: when there is either 
''particularly long-standing .. . discrimination," or when "necessary to 
dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination,"238 even if 
the discrimination has ended. Both are common phenomena and can 
be judged by objective standards, without any necessary connection 
with "egregiousness" or other culpable aspects of the discrimination. 
C. Narrow Tailoring 
The differences between the constitutional and statutory standards 
are even more marginal when one examines the second half of the 
constitutional equation and its statutory analogue: the constitution-
ally required narrow tailoring of the plan, and the Title VII imple-
menting conditions set down in Weber and followed in Sheet Metal 
Workers and Johnson. 
The constitutional factors were first set out by Justice Powell in 
Fullilove and Sheet Metal Workers as follows: 
(i) [T]he efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the planned duration of the 
remedy; (iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority workers 
to be employed and the percentage of minority group members in the 
relevant population or work force; and (iv) the availability of waiver pro-
visions if the hiring plan could not be met. . . . A final factor of primary 
importance ... [is] the effect of the [remedy] upon innocent third 
parties. 239 
Similarly, the statutory test also requires "cautious" tailoring.240 In 
evaluating the plan the court must balance a variety of factors, includ-
ing the necessity of the plan;241 whether it is temporary, flexible, and 
proportional to the qualified labor pool;242 and whether it "unneces-
sarily trammel[s] the interests of white [or male] employees" by creat-
ing "an absolute bar to [their] advancement."243 
238. 106 S. Ct. at 3036, 3050 (emphasis added). 
239. 106 S. Ct. at 3055 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice Stevens rejects 
these requirements on the ground that once a violation is found, the ordinary constitutional 
limitations do not apply. National Socy. of Professional Engrs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 
697-98 (1978). See also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400-01 (1947); 
Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066, 1077 n.22 (1986) ("The judi-
cial remedy for a proven violation of law will often include commands that the law does not 
impose on the community at large."). Paradise, 101 S. Ct. at 1078 n.3. See also Johnson, 101 S. 
Ct. at 1443 n.3. There is a good deal of authority for this proposition, which seems reasonable. 
On the other hand, if a remedy may infringe on constitutional rights, additional restrictions seem 
appropriate, because of the importance of what is being infringed, especially if the rights affected 
are those of innocent people. 
240. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3050 & n.48. 
241. 106 S. Ct. at 3050. 
242. See Johnson, 101 S. Ct. at 1461. 
243. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. 
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Both verbally and in practice, the statutory and constitutional cri-
teria amount to the same thing, as the treatment of the district court's 
order in Sheet Metal Workers indicates: the analyses under the two 
sets of standards were identical. 244 
The m9re important question is, of course, how stringently these 
standards will be applied. The 1986 and 1987 cases dealt with all five 
requirements enumerated in Sheet Metal Workers, and despite dissents 
with respect to the Court's application of each of the factors at one 
time or another, they indicate that few affirmative action plans are 
likely to fail these criteria. 
1. Alternatives 
Assistant Attorney General Reynolds also has argued that court-
ordered racial preference plans are a "last resort" remedy to be used 
only "all else failing."245 He seems to have picked up some support 
from Justices O'Connor, Scalia, White, and the Chief Justice, who ar-
gued in Paradise that the one-for-one promotion plan was unnecessary 
given the availability of other alternatives.246 But in apparent response 
to the majority's point that no alternatives were suggested or would 
have been as effective,247 the dissent urged that the district court 
should have at least "considered the efficacy of alternative reme-
dies. "248 Thus, a district court - and perhaps one who voluntarily 
adopts a plan or those agreeing to a consent decree - may need only 
to indicate that there was such consideration to satisfy even the 
dissenters. 
The majority, however, does not demand even that much. In Par-
adise, as he had in Sheet Metal Workers with respect to Title VII, 
Justice Brennan stressed the broad discretion vested in the district 
courts to remedy racial discrimination. "Congress deliberately gave 
the district courts broad authority under Title VII to fashion the most 
complete relief possible to eliminate 'the last vestiges of an unfortunate 
and ignominious page in this country's history,' "249 said Justice Bren-
244. Compare Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3050-52 (statutory), with 106 S. Ct. at 3053 
(constitutional). See also Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1067 (constitutional). 
245. Reynolds A.B.A. Speech, supra note 110, at 4. 
246. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1080. 
247. 107 S. Ct. at 1068-69, 1070 n.28. 
248. 107 S. Ct. at 1082 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3053); see also Hammon 
v. Barry, 813 F.2d 412, 429-30 (D.C. Cir.), affd. on rehearing, 826 F.2d 73, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(alternatives not considered). 
249. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3044 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 
U.S. 405, 418 (1975)). 
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nan. As noted above, Justice Stevens went even further, making a ma-
jority of five for allowing such broad discretion. 
This seems consistent at least with Title VII. The 1972 Amend-
ments to section 706(g) broadened the district court's remedial powers 
to include "any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri-
ate"250 in order "to give the courts wide discretion ... to fashion the 
most complete relief possible."251 Justice Powell made a similar point 
about constitutional cases in Fullilove, where his discussions of prior 
school and employment discrimination cases stressed that even though 
any affirmative remedy ... is likely to affect persons differently depend-
ing upon their race ... this Court has not required remedial plans to be 
limited to the least restrictive means of implementation. We have recog-
nized that the choice of remedies to redress racial discrimination is "a 
balancing process left, within appropriate constitutional or statutory lim-
its, to the sound discretion of the trial court. "252 
The approach taken by the Court in both these recent and earlier 
opinions makes Mr. Reynolds's prediction that the "lower Federal 
courts will no longer reach so quickly and indiscriminately for 'goals 
and timetables' that prefer by race"253 an especially fanciful piece of 
wishful thinking. For if one thing is clear from these decisions, it is 
that a majority of the Justices think the courts of appeals have been on 
the right track. Justice Brennan not only cited lower court cases con-
tinually in Sheet Metal Workers, 254 but explicitly commended their 
"cautious approach,"255 citing a study coauthored by now-Judge 
Harry Edwards.256 For his part, Justice Powell seems to have gone 
out of his way to approve lower court practice. Indeed, in both Sheet 
Metal Workers and Fullilove, he said that he had drawn four of his five 
criteria for a narrowly tailored plan from courts of appeals deci-
sions. 257 And in Bakke, he chose not to cast doubt on the many race-
conscious plans approved by the courts of appeals, but to reconcile his 
250. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). 
251. 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972) (section-by-section analysis of H.R. 1746 submitted by 
Senators Williams and Javits). 
252. 448 U.S. at 508 (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 794 (1976)) 
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Greenawalt, supra note 131, at 114 
("Nor do the courts necessarily reject the use of racial criteria simply because alternatives might 
conceivably suffice."). But see Fullilove where Justice Powell also stressed the need for sensitivity 
to "less intrusive means." 448 U.S. at 510. 
253. Reynolds A.B.A. Speech, supra note 110, at 8. 
254. See, e.g., 106 S. Ct. at 3036, 3037 n.28, 3050 n.47. 
255. 106 S. Ct. at 3050 n.48. 
256. 106 S. Ct. at 3050 n.48 (citing Edwards & Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies/or Employ-
ment Discrimination, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1975)). 
257. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3055 (relying on Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 
448, 510-11 (1980)) (Powell, J. concurring). 
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views with theirs. 258 The lower courts have been approving race-pref-
erential programs for some twenty years, and businesses, unions and 
public agencies have been working with such programs without seri-
ous complaint.259 It would be a radical step indeed to place in jeop-
ardy thousands upon thousands of affirmative action plans covering 
millions of workers, a step that a pragmatic conservative like Justice 
Powell was obviously reluctant to take. 26° 
Moreover, in many instances, there really are not that many alter-
natives to affirmative action.261 Most of the proposals by opponents of 
affirmative action are ineffectual. One list, for example, includes the 
following: 
(a) massive government manpower training programs; (b) intensified ef-
forts to open unions and union training programs; ( c) career ladders for 
training in skills and technical occupations; (d) vigorous enforcement of 
antidiscrimination laws; (e) the use of examination and other selection 
processes which are free of cultural bias, and which are job-related and 
of predictive validity; (f) intensive recruitment of qualified members of 
minority groups; and (g) the use of sensitivity and attitudinal tests and 
criteria for those jobs dealing largely with minority groups. 262 
Unfortunately, almost all of these will often be inadequate, especially 
in view of this Administration's sharp cuts in funding these programs. 
Either they are very expensive, such as manpower training, or very 
long-term, such as career ladders or sensitivity training, or both. Also, 
a program like "intensive recruitment of qualified members of minor-
ity groups" itself reflects race-consciousness, for money dedicated to 
this purpose diverts resources from everyone else on a color-conscious 
basis.263 
258. 438 U.S. at 301-02 & n.40. Compare the Court's approach in Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229, 244-45 & n.12 (1976), where numerous lower court decisions were disapproved. 
259. See note 11 supra. For businesses' acceptance and, indeed, approval of affirmative ac-
tion, see Wash. Post, July 3, 1986, at 1, col. 6 {approval of Court's 1986 affirmative action deci-
sions); Neely, Government Role in Rooting Out, Remedying Discrimination Is Shifting, 16 NATL 
J. 1772, 1774 (1984). Small employers are less happy. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1986, at B4, col. 
3. 
260. For a survey of Justice Powell's work on the Court, see H. SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE 
COURTS ch. 8 (forthcoming 1988); Schwartz, A Pragmatic Independent, A.B.A. J., June 15, 1986, 
at 42 {special issue). 
261. As examples of situations where affirmative action is necessary, Justice Brennan listed 
"recalcitrant employers," where "informal mechanisms ... obstruct employment opportunities," 
and where an employer's reputation discourages applicants. He also noted that affirmative action 
programs may be necessary as interim goals "pending the development of nondiscriminatory 
hiring or promotion procedures." Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3036-37. 
262. Schiff, Reverse Discrimination Re-Defined as Equal Protection: The Orwellian 
Nightmare in the Enforcement of Civil Rights Laws, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 627, 685-86 
(1985). 
263. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 209-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring). A personnel manager com-
mented on these proposals as follows: 
You talk about programs and retraining ... which are fine, because these are many of the 
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Indeed, although Mr. Reynolds and the Administration refuse to 
admit this, it is now indisputable that affirmative action, while no pan-
acea, has improved things significantly. At hearings before the House 
Civil Rights Subcommittee in 1985, not only did individual businesses 
provide qualitative judgments, but several studies were reported which 
showed that 
affirmative action does work, particularly for blacks .... Black employ-
ment has increased from 4 to 10 percent in contractor establishments 
that are covered by affirmative action relative to noncontractor establish-
ments. That has been pretty much across the board in terms of occupa-
tions. It's not true that it's only helping the highly skilled or the 
unskilled or that it's leading to a split in the minority community.264 
same things we are talking about in the black community, but they are dependent ••• on 
altruism and I don't believe in it .... You talk about going to the private sector and private 
industries to do retraining, these are programs that take a tremendous economic investment 
on the part of employers ..•. The trickle-down theory from what we have seen •.• [is] the 
very terror that Mr. [Bayard] Rustin talked about in the black communities, because for us 
it hasn't trickled down or if it does trickle down, we're talking about a long-term program. 
How long is long-term? What do you do in the short-term? 
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CONFERENCE: TO· 
WARD A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 22 (Apr. 8, 1986) (statement of Delia Council, Manpower 
Development Research Corp.). 
264. Hearings, supra note 11, at 107 (testimony of Professor Jonathan Leonard). The follow-
ing is a summary of the findings: 
(1) Black employment share increased relatively more in contractor establishments under 
the affirmative action obligation than in non-contractor establishments between 1974 and 
1980. This holds true in a number of specifications, and it holds true controlling for estab-
lishment size, growth industry, region, occupational structure, corporate structure, and past 
employment share. This appears to reflect changed establishment behavior, rather than the 
selection into contractor status of establishments with high or growing black male employ-
ment share. In other words affirmative action appears to have been successful in increasing 
blacks' share of employment. 
(2) This positive employment impact has been relatively greater in the more highly skilled 
occupations and has resulted in net occupational upgrading for minority males. It is worth 
noting that increases in black employment under affirmative action are not limited to low· 
skill jobs, nor to high-skilled jobs. It appears that affirmative action has promoted black 
employment across the occupational spectrum. 
(3) Compliance reviews have been an effective tool in promoting the employment of blacks. 
Black employment share has increased faster at establishments that have undergone a com· 
pliance review. 
(4) The impact of affirmative action on non-black minorities and on white females has been 
mixed. In particular, while white females gain under affirmative action in establishments 
where their initial share of employment is small, there is some evidence that their employ-
ment growth is slower under affirmative action where their initial shares are great and where 
there have been compliance reviews. To speculate on some possible explanations for this 
divergent effect across protected groups, there has been a large and continuing increase in 
the labor supply of women that may be swamping the relatively smaller demand side effects 
of affirmative action. Among non-black minorities, affirmative action appears to have been 
more effective in larger establishments. 
(5) The employment gains engendered by affirmative action do not seem to be transient. 
Females and black males at a sample of reviewed establishments had a lower share of termi· 
nations relative to hires than other workers. 
(6) Economic growth is among the best policies for bringing minorities and females into the 
workforce. Minority and female employment shares increase fastest at growing establish· 
ments which can more easily accommodate the pressures of affirmative action. 
Id. at 109; see also Wash. Post, June 20, 1983, at A3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1985, at A34, 
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Other studies confirm this. 265 In sum, few other remedies work as well 
or as quickly. As the New York City Corporation Counsel told the 
Supreme Court about the construction industry in the Fullilove case, 
"[l]ess drastic means of attempting to eradicate and remedy discrimi-
nation have been attempted repeatedly and continuously over the past 
decade and a half. They have all failed."266 Where affirmative action 
is ended, progress often stops. 267 
These considerations apply to voluntary plans as much as to court-
ordered ones. As Justice Stevens remarked in Johnson, there must be 
"breathing room" for voluntary initiatives.268 The problems of attain-
ing a work-force untainted by discrimination are very difficult, for eco-
nomic, demographic, personnel, and political reasons. A fair amount 
of trial and error must be permitted. Any insistence on extensive ex-
ploration of possible alternatives could prove fatal to these initiatives. 
Second-guessing and hindsight are always easy, and the time taken to 
try out the alternatives may simply defer remedial action, at a time 
when minority employment and university admissions are already in 
bad shape. 
col. 3 (Letter to the Editor by Herbert Hammerman); Pear, Affirmative Action Effort on Amtrak 
Corridor Praised as Effective, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1986, at Al2, col. l. 
265. Hearings, supra note 11, at 120-27, 151 (early studies); Blumrosen, The Legacy of 
Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 CHr.[-]KENT L. REv. l, 4, 7 (1987). 
266. Brief for Respondents (City of New York) at 33, Fullilove v. K.lutznick, 448 U.S. 448 
(1980) (No. 78-1007), quoted in Schwartz, supra note 134, at 62. 
267. See Trost, Minority Firms Get Smaller Share of U.S. Contracts Under Reagan, Wall St. 
J., Apr. 10, 1984, at 31, col. 4 (decline in minority government contracts upon termination of set-
asides); N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1984, at A24, col. 3 ("Most discriminatory habits in academia are 
nonactionable; affirmative action goals are our only instrument for focusing sustained atten-
tion.") (Letter to the Editor by Mary Bateson). 
An example from Alabama (one aspect of which relating to promotions was before the Court 
in Paradise) illustrates the value of affirmative action. Alabama had always excluded blacks from 
any but the most menial state jobs. In the late 1960s, a federal court found that only 27 of 3000 
clerical and managerial employees were black. Judge Frank Johnson ordered extensive recruit-
ing of blacks, as well as the hiring of the few specific identified individual blacks who could prove 
they were the victims of discrimination (the remedies currently urged by the Justice Depart-
ment). United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970). 
Nothing happened. Another suit was filed, this time just against the state police, and a 50% 
hiring goal was imposed, until blacks reached 25% of the force. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 
703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd., 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). Today, Alabama has the most thor-
oughly integrated state police force in the country, with 20-25% of the force at the trooper level 
black. The decree in Frazer was modified by Judge Johnson to include hiring goals. 340 F. Supp. 
at 706. In a later phase of the case, Judge Johnson said, "this Court's experience reflects that the 
decrees ... must contain hiring goals; otherwise effective relief will not be achieved." United 
States v. Dothard, 373 F. Supp. 504, 507 (M.D. Ala.), affd. sub nom. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 
614 (5th Cir. 1974). See Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1058 n.2, 1059 n.4. Other Alabama agencies 
have also achieved sllbstantial improvements. Huron, But Government Can Help, Wash. Post, 
Aug. 12, 1984, at Bl,\ col. l. 
268. Johnson, l071S. Ct. at 1459. 
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2. Harm to White or Male Workers 
The other major factor is the harm that race- or gender-conscious 
affirmative action imposes on white or male workers. Here too, mat-
ters seem largely settled. Despite the Court's generally favorable treat-
ment of affirmative action, a majority of the Justices are unwilling to 
countenance layoffs that adversely affect identified nonminority 
individuals. 269 
Few problems are more troubling. On the one hand, "[l]ayoffs by 
seniority 'lock in' the effects of past discrimination by continuing the 
advantage white males gained in employment by not having to com-
pete with women and minorities."270 On the other hand, certain per-
haps innocent individuals will suffer if their seniority is overridden. 
Either way somebody is hurt, and there is no objective instrument by 
which to calibrate which group will suffer the most from such layoffs, 
and no criteria by which to judge whose suffering is more unfair or 
more painful. In human terms, it is simply not true that there is no 
difference between hiring preferences and layoff preferences.271 
But the problem doesn't affect only race-preferential layoff pro-
grams. Even when relief is limited to identified victims, some whites 
will lose competitive seniority and will be more vulnerable to layoff. 
This can be a rather large number, if many minorities can show either 
that they were turned away or were deterred from even applying.272 
Also, the expectations raised by seniority are not vested, but are 
269. Justice O'Connor did hold open the possibility that in some circumstances she might 
accept even layoffs, if they were related to a valid hiring goal, Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1857, but she 
gave no details. Given the combination of Stotts, where she joined the majority, and her vote in 
Wygant, it is unlikely she will vote for a race-preferential layoff provision that overrides seniority. 
270. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAST HIRED, FIRST FIRED: LAY· 
OFFS AND CIVIL RIGHTS 36 (1977). For example, the Commission found that fiscal cutbacks 
caused by the 1974-1975 recession had: 
a critical impact on minorities and women. Many had only recently obtained their first 
promising jobs. Increasing numbers had begun to penetrate employment areas of great im-
portance in our society, such as State and local government. Because they have not had 
time to acquire adequate seniority, however, minority members and women have been af-
fected disproportionately by the personnel cutbacks occasioned by this recession, and much 
of their limited progress has thereby been obliterated. In light of dismal predictions of slow 
economic recovery and continuing high unemployment, this recession threatens to lock 
these groups into place as a permanent, expendable economic and social underclass. 
Id. at 60-61. In New York City, "layoffs in mid-1975 of 371 female officers appointed since 
January 1973 by the New York City Police Department ended their brief tenure with the previ-
ously overwhelmingly male police force. Over half of all Hispanic city workers in New York lost 
their jobs between July 1974 and November 1975." Id. at 25-26 (footnotes omitted). 
271. Contra Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1870 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf Sullivan, supra note 
200, at 95. 
272. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In some cases, 
the number of hires from among those actually discriminated against is as great as those who 
would be hired under a goals and timetables approach. Conversation with Barry Goldstein, As-
sistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. 
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frequently overridden and always susceptible to modification either be-
cause of an overriding public policy like a veterans preference,273 or by 
special preferences for union officials.274 Indeed, seniority systems in-
clude so wide a variety of definitions, restrictions, conditions, and 
qualifications, and vary so greatly as to when seniority begins, how it is 
lost, what it covers, what it is subject to, how it is computed, and 
more,275 that modifying a particular system to prevent reversal of 
some modest gains for a congressional policy of the "highest priority," 
such as eliminating the effects of racial discrimination, seems well 
within a court's equity discretion. 
This is not to say alternatives should not be tried. Work-sharing, 
reduced work-weeks, elimination of overtime, and rotational layoffs 
are just some of the possibilities.276 But if none of these work, the 
hard problem must be faced, and if affirmative action hiring is legiti-
mate, then preservation of the modest gains it has achieved seems the 
higher priority. 
Unlike layoffs, the Court seems to accept preferences for promo-
tions, both voluntary as in Johnson, and mandatory as in Paradise. 
Both cases are, however, rather special - Johnson involves a single 
promotion, rather than the application of an over-all quota or goal,277 
and Paradise involved an interim plan that was applied only once. 
The Court's conclusion that a promotion for a woman or minority 
does not constitute an absolute bar to the disadvantaged male or white 
- Johnson himself got a Road Dispatcher position a few years later 
- indicates it may not treat promotions too differently from hiring. 
3. Flexibility, Proportionality, and Duration 
Although there were splits on each of the other three factors in 
these cases, the law seems quite clear and quite reasonable. The Court 
insisted that any goals be applied flexibly, meaning that economic, 
demographic, and other problems in achieving those goals may and 
273. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976); Ford Motor Co. v. 
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 336 (1953); Cooper & Sobol, Seni'ority and Testing Under Fair Employ-
ment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 
1598, 1605-06 (1969). 
274. Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 526-27 (1949). 
275. See Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1534 (1962); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 66 (1982) 
(promotions based on seniority plus certain qualifications); California Brewers Assn. v. Bryant, 
444 U.S. 598, 606-08 (1980). 
276. See Note, Last Hired, First Fired: Seniority, Layoffi and Title VIL· Questions of Liabil-
ity and Remedy, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 343, 398-400 (1975). 
277. The Court pointed this out, but its significance in that context is unclear. Johnson, 107 
S. Ct. at 1447. 
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should be taken into account and the goals revised and postponed if 
necessary.278 The Court also interpreted the duration factor to mean 
not that the plan had to last only a brief period, but rather that it 
could be used only to "attain" a balanced work force, not to "main-
tain" it once the balance had been achieved.279 The proportionality 
factor was construed to mean that the ultimate goal had to be related 
to the qualified pool, though annual goals could exceed minority rep-
resentation in that pool in order to accelerate the process. None of 
these standards is likely to create difficult problems in practice. 
CONCLUSION 
Creating a society free of the effects of centuries and, so far as wo-
men are concerned, millennia of discrimination is very difficult. De-
spite some progress, we are worse off in some areas such as minority 
employment than we were twenty years ago.280 Moreover, although 
many women have successfully moved into the work force, there are 
still many barriers to their advancement; there is even less upward 
mobility for minorities. 
The 1986 and 1987 cases should eliminate at least one obstacle. 
Though problems remain, the effort to kill affirmative action programs 
has failed. 
278. The disagreement in Sheet Metal Workers was over whether the district court had con· 
sidered economic and demographic problems. The disagreement in Johnson was more puzzling: 
even though the county and the Court made it clear that the plan applied to rather broad job 
categories, and the goals were constantly being revised to take the actual qualified pool into 
account, Justice Scalia described the plan as applying to ·~obs," and ignored the county's willing· 
ness to virtually abandon some goals. In any event, the breadth of the job category, which en· 
compasses many jobs, makes it somewhat easier to eliminate the imbalance. 
279. Cf. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436 (1976). 
280. Briefing: On Black Employment, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1987, at A22, col. I. 
